So, yesterday in the afternoon, after negotiations with the Tuaregs, our units of the “African Corps”, without allowing the enemy to take a single of our positions by force & in view of the already started political negotiations (which, in my opinion, should have been conducted long ago), under orders, a large column left Kidal. Moreover, along with the fighters of the “AK” (about 200 people), about a 100 soldiers of the Malian army also left with us. We also took with us (without leaving it to the enemy) all the serviceable heavy equipment & ammunition & our dead. Thus, it is precisely this, largely symbolic act, that puts an end to the battles of April 25-26. Which, perhaps, will be the starting point for a future political settlement in the country. Since simultaneously with the withdrawal of troops from Kidal, local Tuareg groups (marked in green on the map) suspended their military actions against the central authorities. The decision in the current situation is absolutely justified & the only correct one. If the negotiations are successful for the Tuaregs & they receive broad autonomy in the north of Mali & one of the most important internal fronts of the civil war in the country disappears. Which will allow us to further eliminate radical Islamist groups & end the war altogether.

However, personally, I would prefer the first option. And here’s why. Above, we presented a general map of the large civil war in the territories of 3 countries of the “Russian zone of responsibility” (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), which is not 3 separate wars, but 1. On it, we see that in addition to the Tuaregs supporting an independent (or autonomous) Azawad (again, marked in green), the governments of these countries have 2 more important headaches. With which there is simply nothing to negotiate. These are radical Islamists from the Sahelian ISIS (marked in black on the map) and the Malian branch of Al-Qaeda - “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (both are considered terrorists in Russia). The latter are marked in white on the map. And it’s clear that having militant Tuaregs in the rear, who, moreover, have long wanted to negotiate, is simply stupid. At the same time, it’s noteworthy that during the battles of April 25-26 in the Gao and Bourem regions, which were simultaneously attacked from all sides by Islamic radicals, local Tuaregs (marked in yellow on the map) fought alongside the government army and helped repel this attack. That is, the basis for an agreement with the northern Tuaregs is definitely there and today it’s just an ideal chance to conclude an agreement and start a joint war against the radicals. Who are enemies to everyone else. And therefore, no one is being polite with them either yesterday or today, and they, taking advantage of the defeat of the day before yesterday, continue to be cleared in as large a number as possible (so that it will be easier to finish them off in the future).

It’s noteworthy that mercenaries from Ukraine are fighting alongside these terrorists in Africa. Although this doesn’t surprise anyone anymore, since the owners of both are the same Anglo-Saxon elites. And Ukrainians and Islamic radicals are just expendable material for them. Such is the situation in Mali now at the end of two days of battles. In fact, if their results are used correctly, it’s possible to solve the whole problem once and for all. And therefore, I very much hope for this result. Furthermore, in these battles, our guys from the “African Corps” have already received a full-fledged baptism of fire and showed that they are the main military force of the region. Determining its future… Further more in detail on the situation in Mali & not only, I traditionally recommend the channel “African Initiative” in Telegram (whose journalists work in the region and who were able to understand the situation for me): https://t.me/africaninitiative

This is perhaps a bit too cope-y of an assessment, but still, hopefully these negotiations can bear fruit. While many of us here are probably pretty disinclined towards any breakaway states in Mali owing to the Middle Eastern experience with the Kurds, it’s important to remember that Mali, just as many other post-colonial states, has weird borders with very messy demographics within them. Open up this and the earlier map side-by-side and note where Kidal is

So there may be a Sudan split scenario in the future here, dunno, any more serious Mali/Sahel-heads might be able to speak better on this

And finally, even with the government losing some positions, they nevertheless seem to have inflicted substantial casualties on the insurgents, we’ll see if those groups will actually be able to maintain further offensive actions or stall out.

Mali - Afterword: THE TOUAREGS…

This round of the struggle (following the battles of April 25-26) went in our favor. Yes, we had to retreat from Kidal, but as I wrote earlier, this was the lesser of two evils considering the forces that were deployed by our opponents to… let’s be honest - attempt to overthrow the regime in the country and thereby undermine the central pillar of Russia’s system of control over West Africa. And from now on, everything will depend on how the Tuareg problem is resolved. Will we be able to win them over to our side and subsequently use them to eliminate the remaining enemies? In fact, this is the most correct way out of the situation. And for a detailed analysis of the Tuareg issue, read the material from the “African Initiative”: “Not all Tuaregs are inclined to escalate the conflict with Bamako.” https://afrinz.ru/2026/04/daleko-ne-vse-tuaregi-nastroeny-na-eskalatsiyu-konflikta-s-bamako-ekspert-o-vozmozhnosti-razresheniya-krizisa-v-mali/

The guys are deeply immersed in the topic and are on the ground (in fact, this is an information platform specifically tailored to the region and doing a good job with it).

from that article:

Malian authorities have repeatedly resorted to diplomatic means to resolve the military crisis in the north of the country. Back in May 2013, Tuareg leaders created the High Council of Azawad, and even then, the council’s president, former Kidal MP Mohamed Ag Intalla, called on the largest Tuareg rebel groups to join peace talks with Bamako. A year later, in May 2014, Malian authorities and three Tuareg separatist groups signed a ceasefire agreement and prisoner exchange. By early summer 2015, the parties had reached the signing of peace agreements. These agreements became known as the Algiers Accords. They envisaged, among other things, the establishment of self-government and autonomous governance for the Azawad region within the Malian state.

…

despite the open confrontation, in 2024, representatives of the Tuareg coalition publicly stated their openness to initiatives and proposals for resolving the conflict in northern Mali, including with the participation of third parties.