Tervell [he/him]

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Joined 5 years ago
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Cake day: July 27th, 2020

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  • tbf, the thing at the end is actually just a muzzle device - the barrel itself probably isn’t that thick

    see for example the AK-105 or AKS-74U, they similarly have a very wide muzzle device on the end of the barrel (although the function is a bit different to the AO-46)

    here’s another picture of the AO-46 - the smaller bit right at the end, at the bottom of the muzzle device, is probably closer to the thickness of the real barrel





  • I think of it as the “Uzi-style layout” (although technically the Czechoslovaks were actually ahead on that one with the Sa 23-26, and there’s handful of even earlier prototypes, like the MCEM-2 and Shpitalniy, and of course the Japanese Nambu Type 1, which actually did enter production albeit in small numbers), or to be more verbose - the “magazine-in-pistol-grip layout”. But there isn’t really a proper term for it AFAIK.

    The problem with trying to scale this up to a rifle cartridge is that the magazine-grip becomes too large to really grip comfortably - the Soviets actually did try this:

    It could work if you do a sniper-style grip with the thumb resting on the side: https://www.snipershide.com/precision-rifle/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/0882165534b80b3f2734738d0b7a2.jpg (linking this directly since I managed to hit a rate-limit somehow doggirl-gloom)

    But those only work out on sniper rifles since you’re usually shooting from a very stable rest, and your trigger hand isn’t actually doing that much to hold the gun in place - the bipod or whatever else you’re resting the gun on the front, and a monopod on the stock or your other hand at the rear do that, while the shooting hand is mainly there to adjust aim and operate the bolt. On an assault rifle though, that hand does a lot more, and with a janky grip like that the weapon likely wouldn’t be as controllable.







  • They failed to deter Israeli and then US military action, and failed to compel afterwards and get Israel to cease strikes during the war. Strikes only ceased on a mutual basis after the US directly intervened and struck the three nuclear facilities, the USA’s primary objective.

    Okay, this is an argument you keep making that I just don’t get - Israel signs a ceasefire, and yet is not deterred? Like, all this depletion of stockpiles somehow played absolutely no role in the decision-making here - Israel was totally prepared to keep fighting, and they just decided to… stop, despite the fact that they were totally winning in every way, and could keep winning? I genuinely don’t understand the logic here, surely a failure of deterrence on Iran’s part would imply continued occasional bombardment by Israel, as we’re seeing them do in Syria, nonchalantly and consequence-free?

    Like, we literally have a counterfactual in the Ukraine war - Russia isn’t entering in stupid ceasefires proposed by the US, because they’re winning and a ceasefire that disadvantages them doesn’t make sense. Surely Israel, having shown how utterly bloodthirsty it is, would have loved to keep bombing Iran - and yet they didn’t. Maybe the US told them to stop - but surely the US, having shown how utterly bloodthirsty it is, and having the destruction of Iran as a long-standing geopolitical goal, would have loved for Israel (with American munitions) to keep bombing Iran - and yet they told them to stop. What gives?

    Now, this line of argument goes both ways - Iran did accept a ceasefire, so clearly their situation wasn’t ideal either. But I just don’t see how we can keep ignoring that the war, you know, ended in our evaluation of Israeli “success”.

    Iran did not invest all of it’s time and money into a ballistic missile programme to achieve these results

    Ah, so now we’re doing classic “3-day Special Military Operation” stuff - we ascribe maximalist goals to the Iranians that we invented, they don’t meet them, and then we use this to claim they suck. What do we actually know about their plans and the kind of performance they expected from their forces?

    Also, are we just ignoring Iran’s status as, still, a developing country? They may well have wanted more, but this is what they could achieve with their limitations. Obviously a country like Iran cannot truly compete with the imperial hegemon - but they may well be able to give him a bloody nose! We cannot evaluate success or failure without also taking into account the cost on the American/Israeli side - do we dismiss the success of Vietnamese revolution because they took heavy losses against the Americans? Do we dismiss the Soviets in WW2 because they took heavy losses against the Germans? Do we dismiss the Chinese effort in WW2 because they took heavy losses against the Japanese? Forcing your opponent to expend resources, tying down their troops, stretching them thin, all these are small victories, and enough of them eventually add up.

    In fact 40% of Iranian missiles were fired in the first two days of war, and 60% during the following 10 days. This is a military failure of huge proportion, that Iran only managed to fire missiles in reasonable numbers for 48 hours before being suppressed by Israeli left of launch defeat tactics.

    This is assuming that the lower rate is because the Iranians couldn’t fire more missiles, and not because they wouldn’t as a deliberate strategic choice - because they were preparing for a war of attrition, and thus rationed their expenditure of munitions. We see this in Ukraine - Russia has a ton of missiles and drones, but they’re obviously not launching their whole inventory all at once, because they’re in for the long haul, and need to be able to sustain the war effort for years.

    Iran also failed to shoot down a single manned aircraft in 12 days of war, another huge military failure

    This is predicated on the idea that the Israelis were flying large amounts of aircraft directly over Iran, which is an argument that you repeatedly make, but that I don’t think is actually fully proven at this point. We argued about this a while ago, but the evidence you posted several times of supposed JDAMs/SPICEs was a highly inconclusive grainy image, and in my view does not disprove the idea that a lot of Israeli strikes were standoff munitions. I do believe at least some Israeli aircraft must have flown over Iran, especially after the US strikes that also involved hitting air defense sites, but the notion of F-35s flying freely dropping gravity bombs wherever they want doesn’t hold up in my view - and even if they did, the presence of Azerbaijan as a potential comprador hosting air bases also changes the calculus of the degree of penetration of air defense.

    Interceptor stockpiles are limited and interceptors are very expensive, but interception of ballistic missiles was not the primary means of defeat against Iranian ballistic missiles, because of such reasons. This war illustrated that, the primary means of defeat against Iranian ballistic missiles were Israeli “left of launch” attacks, which rendered Iranian missile cities unusable and targeted TELs before launch.

    And how do we know that similarly extreme rates of ammunition expenditure weren’t the case for Israeli ground strikes, given what we know about the paltry production rates of the Western MIC?

    And even in a worst case scenario where Israel can’t contest an Iranian ballistic missile salvo due to lack of interceptors, would this directly affect Israel’s ability to wage war?

    What does “wage war” mean in this case? Is Israel invading by ground somehow, because in that case ballistics are obviously quite effective, as seen in Russia repeatedly striking Ukrainian staging points, training sites and various other troop gatherings.

    If Israel is not leading an actual invasion, then… what exactly are they accomplishing? Iran might not be able to degrade Israel’s ability to lob standoff munitions at it - but it can just wait out until Israel doesn’t have anything to shoot.

    And like, this whole article is that munitions were expended at an unsustainable rate! If the war had continued, Iran would have started affecting Israel’s ability to wage war, because even with their reduced missile launch capability, they’d have been able to just start freely striking. Hence, you know, the ceasefire, which it doesn’t really make sense for Israel to sign if they were doing perfect, right?

    Israel’s ballistic missile defence system allowed them to conduct the war with minimal civilian casualties and economic damage

    But Israel’s nature as a settler state means that settlers getting scared and running away is severe economic damage. Israel has already lost a whole bunch of its population, not to being killed at war, but to just fleeing. They’re struggling to meet military recruitment numbers and getting embroiled in dramas with ultra-Orthodox groups because they’re refusing conscription. They need that population - and yet, even a few Iranian missiles getting through and striking non-military targets depletes Israel of its population, which obviously has military impacts, because there’s less people in Israel left to fight!

    Conventional ballistic missiles, as much as I’m a huge nerd about them, are a very expensive way to deliver minimal damage (hundreds of thousands/millions of dollars per round to deliver a unitary 1000lb warhead or cluster munitions on average),

    And when you add up the cost of an F-35 and all the maintenance it requires over its lifetime, how much cheaper does it end up being?

    Even moving on outside the Iran Israel war, how many Kinzhals and long range Iskanders have Russia fired at Ukrainian airbases throughout the Russia-Ukraine war? Hundreds, maybe over a thousand. In last few weeks alone, Starokostiantyniv has been hit again and again. It’s been hit over and over for three years to be honest. Yet, Ukraine’s airforce is still flying, crossing the Dnieper at low altitude, and then bombing targets on the frontlines. Will Russia use an Oreshnik on Starokostiantyniv?

    And how much is the Ukrainian airforce actually accomplishing, given that the Russians keep advancing? Perhaps missiles are indeed suboptimal for reducing the enemy’s airforce - but they are clearly very effective in other ways. Why are we just focusing on airbases, and ignoring all the other strikes that missiles perform? How many Ukrainian soldiers and foreign mercenaries have been taken out at gathering sites, how many vehicles have been destroyed (now, a lot of that is also drones, but still)?

    Again outside of Israel-Iran, what nation on earth outside of the US, Israel, and NATO countries hosting US AEGIS ashore, could even construct a ballistic missile defence system anywhere near the ability and scale of what the US has assembled today?

    Well, apparently it’s not the US either, because they don’t have the munitions anymore! Two THAAD batteries deployed in a rather small country, supported by multiple ships, and there still were many hits. The US, a country over 400 times larger, has… two batteries as well?

    Also, where did this even come from, this has nothing to do with the article? The point isn’t “wow, Russia/China’s so much better” - it’s “US air defense can only do so much with the limited ammunition and batteries availabe”. China and Russia can also suck - everyone sucks, because air defense is a tough nut to crack.

    But in a world where everyone’s air defense fails, the country with the greater stockpile and capacity to keep producing munitions is in a better position - they’ll get hit a bunch, but they’ll hit their opponent much more (and then we all die in posadist-nuke when the West realizes they’re fucked, but anyway)







  • continued


    Adding to the challenges posed by the heavy volumes of attacking missiles, U.S. ships had to head to port in the Mediterranean or the Red Sea after shooting all of their interceptors, because the Navy doesn’t yet have a reliable way to reload at sea. The tight fit for a 30-foot-long missile canister to slide into a vertical launch tube means sailors can’t have a ship rocking back and forth during reloading—which could be a major problem for the U.S. in the event of a potential conflict with China. “Reloading missiles at sea is a challenging task due to the sheer weight and size of the encanistered missiles,” Freed said.

    But the biggest problem is still quantity. Karako, the missile-defense analyst, said the war and the possibility of other conflicts showed the U.S. needs huge numbers of additional interceptors. “The other worry is that the Iranians are going to do this again,” he said. “And we can’t afford to do it again.”

    damn, so, uh, turns out… the Iranians actually did pretty good?


  • I guess the estimate for THAAD use has gone up from 14% to ≈25%! https://archive.ph/74N1x

    Israel’s 12-Day War Revealed Alarming Gap in America’s Missile Stockpile

    During conflict, Thaad operators burned through nearly a quarter of interceptors ever purchased by Pentagon

    TEL AVIV—The U.S. has seven high-end Thaad missile-defense systems. During the 12-day war with Iran in June, two were deployed to Israel—and it wasn’t enough. Operating alongside Israeli systems, Thaad operators burned through munitions at a furious clip, firing more than 150 missiles to shoot down the waves of Iranian ballistic missiles, according to U.S. officials. That is nearly a quarter of the interceptors ever purchased by the Pentagon. The demand was so staggering that at one point, the Pentagon considered a plan to divert interceptors purchased by Saudi Arabia to the systems in Israel, one official said. The discussions were sensitive, because the kingdom’s cities and oil installations were also considered at risk during the conflict. It wasn’t just the Thaad. The U.S. ran through large numbers of shipborne interceptors as well, and Israel quickly drained stockpiles for its own systems. Dozens of Iranian missiles got through anyway.

    more

    While Israeli officials credited the American systems for saving thousands of lives, the war revealed an alarming gap in U.S. supplies. The U.S. also discovered inefficiencies in the way it fired its antimissile systems and is scrutinizing the performance of some interceptors. Some Pentagon planners say America’s missile defenses—designed to protect U.S. troops and assets from targeted attacks by Russia, China or North Korea—are inadequate for a world where cheap, voluminous ballistic missiles have become the aerial weapon of choice. The U.S. Navy fought this spring with Yemen’s Houthi militants, who have made missiles a centerpiece of their arsenal. Ukraine has been repeatedly bombarded by Russia, which is using missiles and drones rather than putting its pilots at risk. China has made heavy investments in missile development and is rapidly building weapons it could use to keep the U.S. at bay in any future conflict over Taiwan.

    “We are at long last waking up to the need for massive defensive munitions procurement,” said Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, soon to take the helm of the U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, told Congress in June that officials need to move with a sense of urgency. “I’m concerned about everything, but one of the concerns would be munitions and magazine depth,” Cooper said. Each Thaad—which stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense—can hold 48 interceptors between six launchers and needs about 100 U.S. soldiers to reload, analyze data, perform maintenance and shoot interceptors around the clock. “To my knowledge the U.S. has never deployed two Thaads in one country before,” said Dan Shapiro, who led Middle East policy at the Pentagon in the Biden administration and is now a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank. “It’s an extraordinary commitment of U.S. technology and personnel to Israel’s security.”

    The Pentagon sent a replenishment of interceptors during the war, but supplies were tight. Each Thaad interceptor costs about $13 million, according to budget documents, and the Pentagon has purchased around 650 since 2010. Officials have sought to buy 37 in the next fiscal year. Lockheed Martin, which makes the systems, says it can make about 100 interceptors this year and is working with the government on options to increase production for new orders. It would likely take more than a year and cost between $1.5 billion and $2 billion to replenish the Thaad interceptors fired during the 12-day war, according to Wes Rumbaugh, a CSIS fellow who researches Pentagon missile procurement and budget details. The deployment to the Middle East has strained U.S. readiness and signaled a growing need not just for interceptors, but also for more launchers, analysts say.

    Army officers say that in a perfect world, two Thaads should be in the U.S. for every one deployed. Under this concept, one system is deployed, another is returning for maintenance and upgrades, and a third is involved in training for the next deployment. Of the U.S.’s seven operational Thaads, two are currently on the front lines in Israel. Two others are pledged long term to Guam and South Korea, another is deployed to Saudi Arabia, and two are in the continental U.S. An eighth system has been manufactured but isn’t fully operational. With five of seven Thaads deployed, the U.S. will likely run into “dwell” issues where units don’t get needed downtime between deployments, according to an Army officer who helps train air defenders.

    Although Israel has its own sophisticated, multilayered defense, which includes systems like Arrow, David’s Sling and Iron Dome, the country was running low on its own interceptors and was husbanding resources by the time the conflict ended. Had Iran fired a few more large volleys of missiles, Israel could have exhausted its supply of top-tier Arrow 3 munitions, one of the U.S. officials said.

    well, let me just give myself a pat on the back for guessing this a couple weeks ago doggirl-smug https://hexbear.net/comment/6332873#%3A~%3Atext=It+could+well+be+that+the+Israelis+were+just+about+to+finish+their+stockpiles+as+the+ceasefire+was+signed (although, unpatting myself a bit, this is for specifically “top-tier” air-defense munitions, I was talking more broadly about munitions as a whole)

    The Israeli military said it doesn’t disclose the number of interceptors or operational details related to its air-defense systems. However, it added that “throughout the war, the IDF had had the necessary means to defend its sovereignty and protect its civilians.” As the war progressed and Iranian barrages continued, the U.S. rushed Navy destroyers equipped to shoot down ballistic missiles toward Israel, sending seven into the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea. Most of America’s Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers are armed with a range of Standard Missile interceptors, known as SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6, which can shoot down ballistic missiles and other aerial threats. Those warships also went through interceptors at an alarming rate, the acting chief of naval operations, Adm. James Kilby, said on Capitol Hill in June. During the 12-day war, the ships shot about 80 SM-3s at Iranian threats, according to a U.S. official. SM-3s, which are made by defense contractor RTX, cost between $8 million and $25 million depending on the variant.

    the annual production of SM-3s, as of 2024? TWELVE (although they were supposed to be ≈30 of the older variant plus those 12 of the new one, but they just cut the old one and didn’t bother expanding production of the new one…)

    There also are concerns in the Pentagon that the SM-3s, first used in combat last year, also to counter an Iranian attack, didn’t destroy as many targets as expected, according to two defense officials. The military now is carefully looking through each launch to better understand what happened. A Navy officer involved in the process said it is premature to judge SM-3 engagements. “Testing and operational data from combat use consistently demonstrates that SM-3 are highly effective interceptors that have demonstrated the ability to defeat complex threats in the most stressing environments,” an RTX spokesman said. Two Navy officers who have operated in the Middle East said sailors likely struggled with deconfliction, because the U.S. and Israel rely heavily on voice communications to sort out which systems will take out which missiles. In the fog of war, it is possible several ships fired at the same threats. Along with dozens of warheads, operators can also see debris, decoys and rocket boosters flying through the air. While sailors are trained to pick up on the differences, the airspace in the war was so saturated that they may have struggled to identify the correct target, the officers said. “Achieving successful lethal object kills in dense raid environments becomes significantly more complicated as the number of ballistic missiles increases,” said Tri Freed, a chief engineer in the air and missile defense sector of Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory.

    ah, great, so the air-defense systems that there aren’t anywhere near enough of also massively decrease in effectiveness when the enemy launches more than a handful of missiles at them! another win for “quantity has a quality of its own” I guess bugs-stalin


    a little bit leftover in the next comment, since I hit the char limit







  • The M134 has a rate-of-fire varying between 2000 & 6000 rounds-per-minute, although that upper end is rarely used, it’s usually set somewhere between 3000 & 4000. So, with 2000 rounds, that’s 20 to 30 seconds worth of shooting, and presumably each drone would take a few seconds of shooting to actually take down, so you do end up with, let’s say, 10 to 15 bursts (some of which might not hit at all).

    With automatic targeting where the drones can just be sniped out of the sky with a very short burst it’d work out a lot better, but I’m not sure if bolting a whole CIWS system (although a decent bit smaller since it’d be in 7.62x51mm instead of 20mm) to each tank would really be viable.

    Accuracy and ammunition expenditure will be much better if you’re shooting the drones from really close, which we see in Ukraine, but at that point you can use regular small arms, I’m not sure a minigun really makes sense. And it’s obviously a risky approach.


  • I always thought about something like that but I thought there will be other reasons not to implement it.

    I think the main problem here is ammunition - miniguns are really cool in Call of Duty, where mounted machine guns have infinite ammo for gameplay reasons, but realistically it’s actually pretty difficult to sustain the ammunition expenditure, which is why they’re mostly seen in emplaced positions or on aircraft. Dedicated SPAAGs like the Shilka (which use autocannons with rates of fire nowhere near the level of a minigun - that’s why they pair several cannons together, to essentially multiply the rate of fire) need to have a substantial amount of their internal volume occupied by ammo:

    On an already-built tank, you don’t exactly have a bunch of empty space waiting to be filled, so without a substantial redesign of the turret (which would presumably involve sacrificing some of your regular cannon ammo, thus making the tank worse at its actual original role), the minigun would only be good for a couple bursts before you run out - so your opponent would simply need to send a handful of cheap drones to waste your ammo, and then finish you off when you’re dry.

    Maybe get a tankette and replace the gun with 12.7 gatling gun for better anti drone capabilities and use it to support allied tanks

    The Russians actually did design a so-called “tank support” vehicle - the BMPT, although its intention is more-so to fight sneaky infantry trying to hit the tank with ATGMs than provide air defense. But still, the concept could be adapted to that, but I don’t think we’ve seen any such developments in Ukraine for now.

    However, that’s based on a proper tank chassis, rather than being a tankette - here again we get into the ammo problem, a small and light vehicle wouldn’t be able to actually carry that much minigun ammo (and would be very vulnerable to being taken out by drones itself - while it fires on one target, it could be attacked from another angle), so you’d really need something a lot bigger and heavier to make this viable.


  • wait, so Western rearmament is all just loans? https://archive.ph/6wP75 (yesterday’s episode in this saga: https://hexbear.net/comment/6366482)

    Poland Gets New U.S. Loan for Weapons, Plans to Use It to Upgrade its F-16 Fighter Jets

    U.S. gives Poland new FMF loan to keep key arms buyer — funds will go to F-16 upgrades, helicopters, and air defense systems. Poland will receive a new $4 billion loan from the United States under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. This will be the country’s fifth such loan in the past two years. In total, Poland has recently secured $15.08 billion in military loans.

    dawg I love to be 5 loans deep into my military modernization program, this will surely have no further consequences down the line

    also, btw, some of you military procurement heads may have heard of all the South Korean tanks and other gear that the Poles are buying. You know how they’re financing that? That’s right - a loan… from, uh, South Korea?! Love to loan a guy some cash so he can then pay me my own money to buy my stuff!

    According to Defense24, the new funds will be used to upgrade its F-16C/D Block 52+ fighter jets, as well as to purchase AH-64E Apache helicopters and Patriot air defense systems. The U.S. has stated its interest in continuing cooperation in this area. The F-16 upgrades will include new AN/APG-83 SABR AESA radars, mission computers, data fusion systems, electronic warfare systems with updated databases, modern weapon systems, and other improvements.

    Previously, after the announcement of the new U.S. defense budget, there were concerns in Poland that it might no longer be able to access FMF loans for new weapons purchases — essentially jeopardizing large defense contracts with American companies. As an alternative, the European Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program was proposed, allowing countries to borrow funds to purchase European-made weapons. Poland even created a list of qualifying domestically produced equipment under the program. For example, the Czech Republic plans to use SAFE funding to acquire Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks. Even Ukraine has expressed interest in such funding to address urgent needs in UAVs, missiles, and ammunition.

    Now it’s clear that Poland does not have to give up on U.S. weapons while having an alternative path for procuring European equivalents. This allows Warsaw to choose the better option and cover a broader range of defense needs. Of course, the loans will eventually need to be repaid —but given their favorable terms, they allow Poland to strengthen its defense now and spread the financial burden over time. It’s not a perfect solution, but it’s a practical and available tool.



  • https://archive.ph/zZo2t

    Leopard 2A8 Turned Out So Expensive, Czechia Has To Use EU’s SAFE Loans

    Czechia has struggled to fund the purchase of Leopard 2A8 tanks for a long time, but now may be able to sign the contract thanks to the EU’s SAFE credit initiative Czechia has officially acknowledged that it lacks the funds to purchase new Leopard 2A8 tanks and is now considering applying for a loan through the EU’s Security Action For Europe (SAFE) program. The plan covers the acquisition of 44 tanks and 17 specialized support vehicles, with an option for an additional 14 tanks and two vehicles.

    By the by, communist Czechoslovakia manufactured, domestically, 1700 T-72s over the course of 9 years.

    The decision to pursue a loan appears reasonable, given that even this relatively modest order is estimated to cost around 52 billion Czech crowns ($2.5 billion). That’s a substantial investment even for wealthier NATO members. The agreement is further strengthened by a joint procurement framework with Germany, which allows for a larger, potentially cheaper batch order, while also exempting Czechia from paying VAT, making the deal even more interesting and cheaper for Prague. Deliveries are expected to be completed by 2030.

    As a quick reminder: the SAFE initiative allows EU countries to obtain loans to purchase military equipment from European and Ukrainian defense manufacturers. The total loan pool can reach up to €150 billion. Under SAFE, countries receive favorable terms — interest rates of around 3.3% per year, with a 10-year grace period on repaying the principal. Loan repayment can be spread out over a maximum of 45 years. Earlier, Defense Express reported on Ukraine’s planned use of SAFE loans to strengthen its own defense industry, mainly focusing on domestic UAVs, missiles, and munitions. Meanwhile, Czechia is actively working on several procurement programs, including Swedish short-range air defense systems and command vehicles based on the TITUS armored platform. At the same time, the country faces setbacks — such as the recent scandal around the CAESAR 8x8 howitzers.

    and on that scandal: https://archive.ph/pein5

    spoiler

    Czechia Threatens to Cancel CAESAR 8х8 Contract After First Delivered Units Fail Range Tests

    Czech Ministry of Defense threatens to suspend payments for French CAESAR howitzers after the first two units failed to meet key performance specs during testing The Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic is threatening to freeze payments to French manufacturer KNDS and may even cancel its order of 62 CAESAR 8×8 wheeled self-propelled howitzers. The warning comes after disappointing results from tests of the first two units received under the contract, according to the Czech news media Novinky.cz.

    Czech officials had hoped the CAESARs would bring modern firepower and long-range strike capability. However, the first systems failed to achieve the advertised 40 km range and could not perform MRSI firing — a technique where multiple shells land simultaneously on a single target by varying barrel elevation and timing. To make matters worse, France did not provide the necessary fire control tables. Without them, Czech forces cannot verify whether the systems meet NATO standards — a critical gap in documentation for a system already partially delivered.

    Another serious problem lies in the fire control system itself. The CAESAR 8×8 for Czechia was equipped with the German-made Adler III system, which turned out to be incompatible with Czech-made 155mm ammunition. And yet, Prague had already spent additional 310 million crowns (€12.6 million) on acquiring the system. So far, Czechia has paid 7 billion crowns (€285 million) in advance and is expected to transfer another billion (€40 million) in 2025. But these technical and logistical issues are raising doubts about whether the deal should proceed as planned. Interestingly, the country is still continuing the production of 65,000 Polica 155mm shells for the CAESAR system at the STV Group’s facilities, even as the howitzer itself undergoes scrutiny.

    Defense Express emphasizes that despite the frustration, the Czech Ministry of Defense does not appear ready to walk away from the deal. Instead, it seems intent on pressuring KNDS to resolve the issues and deliver the full batch. One likely reason: the Czech Army urgently needs to replace its current fleet of 48 DANA howitzers, and sourcing 62 modern SPHs from alternative suppliers on short notice would be extremely difficult.

    well, uh, good luck with your “pressuring”… bet you miss the old days when you could have just made that stuff at home (although technically that one was made in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, but still, Czechia was the more industrialized half, especially until after WW2 when industrial development of Slovakia started taking off)


  • how’s that expansion of military production going? https://archive.ph/cdXZr

    How Did Romania Not Even Start To Build a Gunpowder Plant With Rheinmetall After a Year

    Despite earmarking €47 million for the project, Romanian bureaucracy halted the plant’s construction, with land allocation becoming the main obstacle One of the current areas of defense cooperation between Romania and the German defense giant Rheinmetall includes a project to build a gunpowder production plant. The project has an estimated budget of €500 million, and the facility is expected to begin operations two years after the construction starts. However, due to specific bureaucratic hurdles in Romania, the practical implementation of this project has been “on hold” for a full year, despite the fact that €47 million have already been allocated from the state budget. This was reported by Defense Romania.

    Citing Romanian Defense Minister Ionuț Moșteanu, the authors explain that the main issue has been securing land for the construction of the plant. This problem has even triggered a separate investigation in the country’s parliament. Interestingly, despite these bureaucratic delays, Rheinmetall still plans to deepen its cooperation with Romania in other promising defense projects. One of those is the modernization of four existing Oerlikon GDF-003 35mm anti-aircraft artillery systems in service with the Romanian armed forces. The €328 million contract, signed in 2023, aims to upgrade these platforms to a functionality similar to the Skynex system — particularly by modernizing their fire control equipment.

    Additionally, Rheinmetall is also offering its KF41 Lynx platform in Romania’s ongoing tender for 246 infantry fighting vehicles, a project valued at €2.5 billion. This all comes as Rheinmetall acquired a 72.5% controlling stake in the Romanian military equipment manufacturer Automecanica Mediaș SRL in 2024. The company has since been rebranded as Rheinmetall Automecanica and will focus on manufacturing and servicing military trucks, infantry fighting vehicles, and air defense systems.






  • https://archive.ph/3pP4t

    No time to waste: NATO chief urges rapid industrial mobilization

    As the U.S. and its allies in Europe pledge to ramp up defense spending amid mounting global threats, the supreme allied commander of Europe is calling on industry to deliver real capabilities to the field in record time. “We can tell industry exactly what it is that we need for all the leaders that are out there. It’s our job, I think, to hold industry accountable to deliver quickly and to hold ourselves accountable for giving industry the ability to deliver quickly through our acquisition processes,” U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich said July 17 during his first public speech since taking command at the Association of the U.S. Army’s inaugural LandEuro conference in Wiesbaden, Germany.

    “hold industry accountable”? Uh, yeah pal, it’s called nationalization and economic planning, but I’m afraid that’s all lost technology, even the Adeptus Mechanicus can’t figure out what it was all about. We just don’t know!

    “We’ve got to do this fast. We need real capabilities and we need them delivered as soon as possible. We can’t afford to wait, future pledges are no longer enough,” he said. “To do this, the defense industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic is going to have to become fully activated.” Grynkewich stressed there’s plenty of work to go around, it’s not a matter of investing in one or the other. “It needs to be one seamless industrial base that can deliver capability and capacity for the alliance,” he said. Moving quicker is easier said than done. Every country will have to contend with their own budget approval process and work through red tape across borders.

    U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made a pledge earlier this year on a trip to NATO headquarters that the U.S. would conduct major foreign military sales reform. Even so, the U.S. military and NATO have developed solid regional plans beginning with a clear one focused on the Baltic States that will help guide government and industry in getting capabilities to units there. The U.S. Army Europe and Africa commander, speaking a day earlier at the conference, said the “Eastern Flank Deterrence Line” plan aims to enhance ground-based capabilities and drive military-industrial interoperability across the alliance.

    As part of the plan to counter Russian threats and enable scalable, global deterrence, the Army and its NATO allies are urgently developing standardized, data-driven systems, common launchers and cloud-based coordination. The plan includes a system to share data. NATO has already procured that system – Palantir’s Maven Smart System – an artificial intelligence platform that takes a vast amount of data and rapidly analyzes information to help military commanders make decisions. U.S. Army Europe and Africa officials have also adopted Maven at headquarters, using it for mission command and visibility across the theater. The system has completely replaced PowerPoint briefings and offers information to commanders in real-time.

    you know what’s going to drag us out of our deindustrialization quagmire? that’s right, THE CLOUD! AND AI!

    On NATO’s wish list, according to Grynkewich, are capabilities that mirror a Ukrainian brigade. “How do we get our brigades to have the same level of capability where we can match what they’re able to do today?”

    ah, so they’re finally admitting that the Ukrainians are way ahead of them in terms of adaptation to the modern battlefield… but wait, aren’t those guys, like, not doing too good? Uh oh! columbo-donk

    Additionally, Grynkewich said he wants to focus on air defense. “There’s never enough air defense. You always want more, but it’s an acute requirement, whether it’s counter-[unmanned aircraft systems] or counter-ballistic missiles,” he said. And there will also be a continued focus on long-range fires, Grynkewich noted. “We need the capability to hold things at risk.”

    Industry now has real incentives in place, Grynkewich said, with the new commitment made by NATO nations at the last summit to spend 5% of their gross domestic product on defense by 2035. “I would ask industry folks who are here and elsewhere to realize that sustained commitment should be a powerful signal to do the things you need to do, to expand production lines, to increase [research and development] spending, etc., so that we can get where we need to go,” he said.

    “a signal to do the things you need to do” y’know, maybe you shouldn’t need to fucking “signal” industry, like “oh pretty please expand your production lines, c’mon guys!”, maybe you should be able to, I dunno, order them to do so?

    Leadership is now moving to deliver new and emerging technology to the battlefield along with legacy technology that is still relevant and will work to make things interoperable. “I challenge each of the chiefs of defense, land forces commanders and every leader in here to hold themselves to account for that. There’s no time to waste,” Grynkewich said.

    this guy really loves holding stuff accountable I guess


  • https://archive.ph/FyIgD whoops, MIC machine broke!

    US diverts Patriot systems from Switzerland to Ukraine

    U.S. officials have told the Swiss government that Patriot air defense systems in the production pipeline for the alpine country would be diverted to help defend Ukraine, according to a Swiss announcement. The July 17 statement by the Swiss, which said the notification from the United States arrived the prior day, illuminates some of the hasty mechanics behind Washington’s newfound emphasis on helping Ukraine repel near-constant Russian attacks with missiles and drones.

    Switzerland ordered five Patriot systems, made by Ratheon, in 2022. Deliveries were set begin in 2026 and go through 2028. The U.S. foreign military process, which governs the sale, makes the diversion of defense goods possible, the Swiss announcement notes. No information was available about how many systems would be affected and what the new timing for future deliveries would be. Switzerland’s Patriot pick was part of a lengthy air-defense and air-policing review by the government that also led to an order of 36 U.S. F-35 fighter aircraft.

    Last year, the United States told Switzerland that a batch of ordered PAC-3 MSE interceptors, the most advanced interceptors fireable with Patriot, would similarly be diverted to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Germany this week offered to buy two Patriot systems from the U.S. and give them to Ukraine. One Patriot setup costs roughly $1 billion, depending on the number of interceptors, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said during a visit to Washington on July 14. Details for the purchase are now under discussion with the U.S. administration, Pistorius said following talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Outstanding questions surrounding the transaction are all “solvable,” he added.

    Speaking at the LandEuro conference in Wiesbaden, Germany, on July 17, top NATO commander U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich signaled a new dynamic in supplying Kyiv with the defensive weapons. Grynkewich said he would bring European nations together to work on delivering Patriot and other capabilities to Ukraine. The idea is to “look at what’s the art of the possible” in orchestrating the flow of new production equipment to Ukraine’s defense, he said.

    Unlike Russia with its weak economy having to delay deliveries of equipment, the Western MIC is going strong! stonks-down