Kraut media is currently in an uproar over the fact that several high-ranking government officials had their data stolen after falling for phishing messages disguised as coming from the Signal messaging app. Deeply unserious headlines now accuse Russia of allegedly jeopardizing Germany’s national security by “hacking Signal,” even though the perpetrators have not yet been identified and the app itself was not actually compromised in any way.

According to media reports, several German politicians have fallen victim to a phishing campaign in recent weeks. According to information from Der Spiegel, Education Minister Karin Prien (CDU), Construction Minister Verena Hubertz (SPD), and Bundestag President Julia Klöckner (CDU) have been affected. Other politicians, journalists, and military personnel have also been targeted.

In the current phishing attack, the attackers are posing as Signal support staff, among other things. Users are asked to enter their PIN or scan a code. If they do so, the attackers gain access to messages, photos, and documents that have been shared via Signal. Despite lacking evidence, Russia is blamed for the attack.

While German government has not yet officially attributed the attack to Russia, media like Die Zeit has nonetheless set its sights on the country: Berlins reluctance could supposedly “be related to the fact that it might compromise intelligence gathered by allied intelligence services.” But according to the Die Zeit article, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is investigating the alleged espionage in Germany, has also not yet commented on a possible instigator. Die Zeit adds, however, without getting specific or offering citations, that the German government “apparently” assumes “presumed” Russian responsibility.

It can be noted: The perpetrators are apparently still unknown, and the methods they used (phishing messages) do not, in and of themselves, initially point to a “state actor” at all, as is now being claimed everywhere. The phishing scam is also not “sophisticated” or “perfidious” or in any way a Russian specialty: The scam is widely known and can be carried out without much effort (and without a “state actor” backing it).

It is just as easy to fend off such campaigns by following well-known rules. Given the apparent lack of IT security expertise among many politicians, one can only underscore what Linus Neumann of the Chaos Computer Club says about the incident:

It wasn’t Signal that was hacked, but Ms. Klöckner herself. For someone holding the second-highest office in the country, this is a significant personal failure, but it is part of a system that made it possible.

The fact that the circumstances regarding the perpetrators remain unclear has not stopped some politicians and journalists from exploiting the phishing campaign for their anti-Russian agenda and simply giving the impression that there is genuine evidence the campaign originated from the Russian government. For example, the Süddeutsche Zeitung is already reporting without any reservations of a “Russian espionage attack”:

Russia’s espionage attack on top German politicians has sparked a heated debate over the security of government communications.

The newspaper cites German security authorities as its source: they are reported to be “certain” that the phishing attack was “once again” orchestrated from Russia. The German government shares this assessment, though it’s not explained in what terms or on what factual basis. The U.S. FBI is cited as another source for the claim that the Russian state was responsible, and some media outlets also mention the Dutch intelligence agency. As usual, it remains unclear how these sources arrived at their supposedly certain identification of the perpetrators.

In some quarters, meanwhile, trust in such claims knows no bounds. There, the perpetrators are already deemed certain, even if this leads to contradictions: For instance, Konstantin von Notz, deputy leader of the Green Party parliamentary group, tells the ARD’s Berlin bureau that it is not easy to identify the source of the attacks. On the other hand, he declares with absolute conviction, as if a proper court had identified the guilty parties in a transparent proceeding:

This espionage attack must serve as a wake-up call for all security agencies. We must understand what Moscow’s agenda is here: Russia has declared Germany an enemy. These attacks are real and pose a genuine threat to our security. Every day, agents are operating here, spying and planning acts of sabotage.

CDU security policy specialist Roderich Kiesewetter goes a step further and, despite the nonexistant factual basis, is not surprisingly calling for radical measures. “Russia must be stopped, at every level,” he told the Handelsblatt. “We should implement every measure we can to credibly strengthen our deterrence.” Kiesewetter advocated, among other things, expelling Russian diplomats and supplying “Taurus” cruise missiles to Ukraine.

According to media reports, CDU lawmaker Marc Henrichmann, chairman of the Bundestag’s Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr) for the oversight of intelligence services, became the first German politician to blame Russia for the phishing attempts on Friday:

The latest phishing attempt from Russia targeting German politicians and journalists is a wake-up call for all of us.

As the Süddeutsche Zeitung reports, government officials actually have access to extremely secure communication channels, such as specially encrypted devices and lines. However, according to the paper, these are considered complicated and impractical because popular apps cannot be used through them. Furthermore, according to the Federal Office for Information Security, 62 percent of Germans have received phishing messages at some point. Obviously, the method is neither new nor “sophisticated” nor “Russian,” and it doesn’t require a “state actor” either. The FBI could warn all governments (and all private citizens) year-round about such widespread attacks. And Russians are the only ones who are supposed to have mastered this trick?

Based on current information, it is much more likely that the German politicians involved fell victim to their own complacency and ignorance rather than to some sinister force. That would, of course, be very embarrassing for those involved; an exaggerated Russian bogeyman is thus conjured provide a welcome distraction from their own failures while simultaneously further entrenching anti-Russian hysteria.

On a different note, there is, thanks to U.S. whistleblower Edward Snowden, hard evidence that another country has been conducting massive espionage operations against German politicians, including the Chancellors office, and is presumably still engaging in such practices.

So, yesterday in the afternoon, after negotiations with the Tuaregs, our units of the “African Corps”, without allowing the enemy to take a single of our positions by force & in view of the already started political negotiations (which, in my opinion, should have been conducted long ago), under orders, a large column left Kidal. Moreover, along with the fighters of the “AK” (about 200 people), about a 100 soldiers of the Malian army also left with us. We also took with us (without leaving it to the enemy) all the serviceable heavy equipment & ammunition & our dead. Thus, it is precisely this, largely symbolic act, that puts an end to the battles of April 25-26. Which, perhaps, will be the starting point for a future political settlement in the country. Since simultaneously with the withdrawal of troops from Kidal, local Tuareg groups (marked in green on the map) suspended their military actions against the central authorities. The decision in the current situation is absolutely justified & the only correct one. If the negotiations are successful for the Tuaregs & they receive broad autonomy in the north of Mali & one of the most important internal fronts of the civil war in the country disappears. Which will allow us to further eliminate radical Islamist groups & end the war altogether.

However, personally, I would prefer the first option. And here’s why. Above, we presented a general map of the large civil war in the territories of 3 countries of the “Russian zone of responsibility” (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), which is not 3 separate wars, but 1. On it, we see that in addition to the Tuaregs supporting an independent (or autonomous) Azawad (again, marked in green), the governments of these countries have 2 more important headaches. With which there is simply nothing to negotiate. These are radical Islamists from the Sahelian ISIS (marked in black on the map) and the Malian branch of Al-Qaeda - “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (both are considered terrorists in Russia). The latter are marked in white on the map. And it’s clear that having militant Tuaregs in the rear, who, moreover, have long wanted to negotiate, is simply stupid. At the same time, it’s noteworthy that during the battles of April 25-26 in the Gao and Bourem regions, which were simultaneously attacked from all sides by Islamic radicals, local Tuaregs (marked in yellow on the map) fought alongside the government army and helped repel this attack. That is, the basis for an agreement with the northern Tuaregs is definitely there and today it’s just an ideal chance to conclude an agreement and start a joint war against the radicals. Who are enemies to everyone else. And therefore, no one is being polite with them either yesterday or today, and they, taking advantage of the defeat of the day before yesterday, continue to be cleared in as large a number as possible (so that it will be easier to finish them off in the future).

It’s noteworthy that mercenaries from Ukraine are fighting alongside these terrorists in Africa. Although this doesn’t surprise anyone anymore, since the owners of both are the same Anglo-Saxon elites. And Ukrainians and Islamic radicals are just expendable material for them. Such is the situation in Mali now at the end of two days of battles. In fact, if their results are used correctly, it’s possible to solve the whole problem once and for all. And therefore, I very much hope for this result. Furthermore, in these battles, our guys from the “African Corps” have already received a full-fledged baptism of fire and showed that they are the main military force of the region. Determining its future… Further more in detail on the situation in Mali & not only, I traditionally recommend the channel “African Initiative” in Telegram (whose journalists work in the region and who were able to understand the situation for me): https://t.me/africaninitiative

This is perhaps a bit too cope-y of an assessment, but still, hopefully these negotiations can bear fruit. While many of us here are probably pretty disinclined towards any breakaway states in Mali owing to the Middle Eastern experience with the Kurds, it’s important to remember that Mali, just as many other post-colonial states, has weird borders with very messy demographics within them. Open up this and the earlier map side-by-side and note where Kidal is

So there may be a Sudan split scenario in the future here, dunno, any more serious Mali/Sahel-heads might be able to speak better on this

And finally, even with the government losing some positions, they nevertheless seem to have inflicted substantial casualties on the insurgents, we’ll see if those groups will actually be able to maintain further offensive actions or stall out.

Mali - Afterword: THE TOUAREGS…

This round of the struggle (following the battles of April 25-26) went in our favor. Yes, we had to retreat from Kidal, but as I wrote earlier, this was the lesser of two evils considering the forces that were deployed by our opponents to… let’s be honest - attempt to overthrow the regime in the country and thereby undermine the central pillar of Russia’s system of control over West Africa. And from now on, everything will depend on how the Tuareg problem is resolved. Will we be able to win them over to our side and subsequently use them to eliminate the remaining enemies? In fact, this is the most correct way out of the situation. And for a detailed analysis of the Tuareg issue, read the material from the “African Initiative”: “Not all Tuaregs are inclined to escalate the conflict with Bamako.” https://afrinz.ru/2026/04/daleko-ne-vse-tuaregi-nastroeny-na-eskalatsiyu-konflikta-s-bamako-ekspert-o-vozmozhnosti-razresheniya-krizisa-v-mali/

The guys are deeply immersed in the topic and are on the ground (in fact, this is an information platform specifically tailored to the region and doing a good job with it).

from that article:

Malian authorities have repeatedly resorted to diplomatic means to resolve the military crisis in the north of the country. Back in May 2013, Tuareg leaders created the High Council of Azawad, and even then, the council’s president, former Kidal MP Mohamed Ag Intalla, called on the largest Tuareg rebel groups to join peace talks with Bamako. A year later, in May 2014, Malian authorities and three Tuareg separatist groups signed a ceasefire agreement and prisoner exchange. By early summer 2015, the parties had reached the signing of peace agreements. These agreements became known as the Algiers Accords. They envisaged, among other things, the establishment of self-government and autonomous governance for the Azawad region within the Malian state.

…

despite the open confrontation, in 2024, representatives of the Tuareg coalition publicly stated their openness to initiatives and proposals for resolving the conflict in northern Mali, including with the participation of third parties.

Buenos Aires, April 28 (Prensa Latina) Diego Sapagnuolo, a close friend of President Javier Milei who headed the National Disability Agency (ANDIS), appears today before the court that will expand his questioning for new facts related to the bribery scandal.

This Tuesday begins a series of 35 investigations in the case that implicates Karina Milei, the president’s sister and secretary general of the Presidency, in which criminal maneuvers involving more than 75 billion pesos (54 million 348 thousand dollars) are being investigated.

Among those summoned will be those accused of laundering “black money” obtained at ANDIS, including Alan Pocovi, linked to the Menem family, and Sergio Mastropietro, the former partner of Fred Machado, who was accused of drug trafficking and extradited to the United States where he is being tried by a court in Texas.

Spagnuolo is the central figure in the “Coimagate” case, which investigates a massive corruption scheme at ANDIS during the libertarian government. The defendant, who was also the president’s lawyer, will be the first of the 35 people summoned by Judge Ariel Lijo, now in charge of the case at the instruction of prosecutor Franco Picardi, to testify.

According to Picardi, the former director of ANDIS is one of the leaders of the criminal organization. In a series of leaked audio recordings that triggered the media frenzy surrounding this case, Spagnuolo can be heard saying that a bribery system operated within the agency under his command, ultimately reaching Karina Milei.

His defense claims that the recordings were altered, but an analysis of the defendants’ cell phones reveals references to “3 percent for KM.” This 3 percent figure is the same one the former head of ANDIS is heard saying in the leaked audio recordings released by Carnaval Stream.

In addition to Spagnuolo, Daniel María Garbellini, who was in charge of the “Incluir Salud” program—the department from which the manipulated purchases currently under investigation were made—is scheduled to appear in court this Tuesday. Garbellini is one of the 19 people already charged in the case.

This process further tarnishes the image of the government, and especially of the Milei brothers. On Monday, Torcuato Di Tella University released its Government Confidence Index (GCI), which reflects that Argentinians have increasingly less confidence in their president.

The ICG, prepared by that private institution, shows that this indicator fell 12.1 percent in April, marking four consecutive months of decline.

The deterioration of the index was widespread, as all five components showed negative variations in April, with particularly marked declines in key areas of government performance evaluation.

The Efficiency parameter saw the largest decline, at 21.4 percent, followed by the General Evaluation of the Government (-17.2%) and Concern for the general interest (-13.9%).

The Honesty component fell by 8.4 percent and the Capacity to govern fell by 2 percentage points.

A trio of polls whose results were released in recent days found that more than 60 percent of Argentinians are currently dissatisfied with the government management of Milei and his executive team.