The dots were added later.

  • livligkinkajou@slrpnk.net
    17·
    14 days ago

    They are already doing that, they even have a playbook on how to try to protect them, but apparently, “Physical protection is a set of structural measures that do not guarantee the safety of protected objects. Solutions do not exclude blast load and shrapnel impact.”

    Inside Rosneft’s Secret Drone Defense Blueprint: How Russia’s Oil Giant Plans to Shield Its Refineries – and Why It Will Fail

    Solution What It Is Rosneft’s Own Admitted Weakness
    Cable barriers around tanks Cable/net mesh (40×40 cm) wrapped around storage tanks on pipe stands “NOT resistant to UAV shrapnel”; only protects against multirotor drones
    Scaffolding cages Modular metal scaffolding erected 5m above tank roofs “Insufficient volume of scaffolding to protect the Company’s facilities”; “high cost”
    Shipping container walls 20-36m high walls from stacked 20/40-ft containers with cable infill at 40 cm spacing Not yet pilot-tested; requires thousands of containers per refinery
    “Tent” canopy over tank farms Overhead cable-mesh tent using containers as structural supports (21m central mast) “Difficulties during firefighting”; “high snow loads”
    Tower crane mast cages Repurposed crane sections forming 4-pillar cage around processing units, cables at 1m spacing Each unit requires individual engineering; relies on surface foundations or guy-wires
    Three-barrier column protection Layer 1: cable screens 1-1.5m out from platforms; Layer 2: nets (40×40 mm mesh); Layer 3: kevlar/aramid wrapping In case of detonation, destruction is inevitable
    Cable fencing for pump stations 6mm cables at 500mm spacing on outrigger brackets Only designed to destroy drone airframe — does nothing against the warhead
    Reinforced concrete panels Reinforced Concrete wall panels replacing sheet-metal wind barriers at pump stations Only covers pump stations — the narrowest, lowest-value target category