A reminder that as the US continues to threaten countries around the world, fedposting is to be very much avoided (even with qualifiers like “in Minecraft”) and comments containing it will be removed.

Image is of Iranians celebrating the beginning of the ceasefire under the framework of Iran’s 10 Points.


Mere hours before Trump’s 8pm Tuesday deadline yesterday, Pakistan’s government contacted Iran with a US-written proposal for a two-week ceasefire, explicitly stated to also include Lebanon, during which they would negotiate a permanent end to the war on the basis of Iran’s 10 Points. Among other things, these points include 1) maintaining strict control (joint with Oman) over Hormuz, complete with a toll; 2) the end of sanctions on Iran; 3) keeping their enriched uranium; 4) a withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East [stated by the Supreme Leadership Council but not in the 10 Points, so who knows], and 5) some plausible guarantee that Iran would never be attacked again. I’ve heard rumors that China may have prodded Iran to accept these terms.

In theory, these are relatively confident and maximalist demands. In practice, Iran has already achieved military and economic control over Hormuz and the withdrawal of many US troops and bases from the region, so at least a few of Iran’s demands are, to a greater or lesser extent, already achieved, and with little hope for an increasingly exhausted US to undo these achievements short of nukes.

A couple hours after the ceasefire, the Zionist entity began a wave of airstrikes in Lebanon, killing hundreds of civilians, as well as flying drones into Iranian airspace. This was a strange move to make even if you assume - very sensibly - that the US is completely agreement non-capable: why not agree to the ceasefire and simply pretend to negotiate for two weeks while regrouping/repairing what assets you can and then start hitting Iran again?

One theory is that the Zionists are testing to what degree Iran is actually willing to have solidarity with Lebanon and Hezbollah. While the Resistance has been relatively united since October 7th, the formation of separate peaces instead of negotiating terms as a united front has been a major exploitable weakness. Alternatively, it’s been proposed that the US didn’t even consider using the ceasefire to regroup and deceive Iran, and that Trump merely wanted a way to chicken out of his threat on Iran’s electrical grid - the fact that US officials have since stated that Iran’s 10 Points were not the same ones they agreed to is a point supporting this, I suppose. If the conflict resumes and Trump does not deliver another 48 hour deadline (and/or makes it something silly like a month from now) then this could be the explanation.

From Iran, I am getting the sense that a lot is happening behind the scenes. Statements from top officials like Araghchi have stated quite plainly that there will be no ceasefire and no negotiations unless the Zionists stop attacking Lebanon, but as of ~24 hours after the ceasefire began, there has been no significant military response from Iran yet. There have apparently been phone calls between Araghchi and numerous regional officials, but it is unknown to what end. All the while, the global economic situation continues to deteriorate. Over the next week or two, the last tankers that left Hormuz before it closed will arrive at their destinations. If the missile exchanges begin once more, then the West, much like most of the rest of the world, will be experiencing all sorts of fuel, energy, food, and product shortages while trying to justify why they broke the ceasefire to kill more Lebanese civilians.


Last week’s thread is here.
The Imperialism Reading Group is here.

Please check out the RedAtlas!

The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.

The Zionist Entity's Genocide of Palestine

If you have evidence of Zionist crimes and atrocities that you wish to preserve, there is a thread here in which to do so.

Sources on the fighting in Palestine against the temporary Zionist entity. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:

UNRWA reports on the Zionists’ destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.

English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.

Mirrors of Telegram channels that have been erased by Zionist censorship.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Sources:

Defense Politics Asia’s youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don’t want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it’s just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists’ side.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.

Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:

Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR’s former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR’s forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster’s telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a ‘propaganda tax’, if you don’t believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.

Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:

Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.


  • Tervell [he/him]@hexbear.net
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    a slightly older article I came across https://archive.ph/UxIbL

    I’m sorry for doubting China’s dedication to stealth aircraft, I wasn’t familiar with your manufacturing game unfamiliar-with-your-game (although as per this other article, at least I wasn’t completely wrong on guessing that they’ll still procure substantial amounts of 4.5-gen aircraft in addition to the stealth ones)

    China Mass-Produces J-20 & J-35 Stealth Fighters at Unprecedented Rate — Satellite Images Show Production Surge That Could Deliver 1,000 Fifth-Gen Jets by 2030

    Satellite imagery and Western defence analysis reveal China is rapidly expanding J-20 and J-35 stealth fighter production capacity, signalling a major shift in global airpower balance and long-term Indo-Pacific force posture.

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    China is rapidly expanding the manufacturing capacity for its Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters, signalling an industrial-scale force-generation strategy that is reshaping the global airpower balance by enabling sustained high-tempo production rates beyond the current limits of Western fighter manufacturing lines. Recent Western open-source intelligence analysis supported by commercial satellite imagery indicates that China’s aerospace industry has transitioned from developmental production cycles to sustained mass-manufacturing of stealth aircraft, a shift that directly affects long-term force posture calculations across the Indo-Pacific, Western Pacific, and carrier aviation domains. Data presented at the 2026 Air & Space Forces Association Symposium by analyst J. Michael Dahm, combined with assessments by the Royal United Services Institute, suggests that the scale of factory expansion, assembly-line multiplication, and infrastructure growth now allows output levels approaching or exceeding those of any single Western fighter program currently in operation. The observed increase in production infrastructure implies that Beijing is prioritising long-term fleet expansion and readiness sustainability, ensuring that future airpower planning is supported by industrial capacity capable of delivering large numbers of fifth-generation aircraft without reliance on limited-rate procurement cycles. Such manufacturing growth also strengthens China’s strategic signalling posture by demonstrating that its defence industry can sustain simultaneous production of multiple advanced combat aircraft types, a capability that complicates adversary force-planning assumptions and reduces the effectiveness of traditional numerical advantage strategies.

    The combination of expanded factory space, multiple active assembly lines, and integrated testing facilities indicates that China is building a wartime-resilient aerospace production network designed to maintain output even during periods of heightened tension or operational demand. This industrial scaling effort further suggests that future PLAAF and PLANAF force structures are being designed around the assumption of abundant stealth aircraft availability, allowing planners to deploy fifth-generation fighters across multiple theatres without weakening air superiority coverage in any single region. Analysts assess that the current pace of expansion reflects a deliberate shift toward high-volume, continuous production models similar to those used during major Cold War build-ups, but applied to fifth-generation platforms, giving China the potential to alter the global balance of advanced air combat capability before the end of the decade.

    Massive Chengdu Expansion Signals Industrial-Scale J-20 Production

    Satellite imagery shows that the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group facility responsible for J-20 assembly has added approximately 278,700 square metres of manufacturing space since 2021, an expansion comparable in size to major Western fighter production complexes and indicative of long-term high-volume output planning. The addition of multiple new assembly halls and support infrastructure has enabled the operation of five active J-20 production lines simultaneously, creating the industrial throughput necessary to sustain annual output levels estimated by analysts at up to 100 aircraft per year under current capacity assumptions. Independent assessments by defence research organisations estimate that production rates could reach roughly 120 J-20 aircraft per year by 2025, a level that would allow rapid expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force stealth fleet without requiring additional major facility construction in the near term. Imagery also shows cleared land adjacent to the Chengdu complex, including areas previously occupied by university grounds, which analysts assess could be reserved for further expansion or for development work related to next-generation combat aircraft programs beyond the current fifth-generation fleet.

    Such infrastructure growth suggests that China’s fighter production strategy is designed not only to meet current operational requirements but also to sustain parallel development and manufacturing pipelines, reducing the risk of bottlenecks during future transitions to new aircraft types. The presence of multiple concurrent assembly lines allows China to maintain production continuity even while introducing upgraded variants such as the J-20A, enabling capability improvements without slowing the overall delivery rate to operational units. This approach reflects an industrial doctrine focused on throughput, redundancy, and scalability, ensuring that fleet expansion can continue even during periods of testing, modification, or engine integration changes. Analysts assess that sustained production at these levels could allow the PLAAF to field several hundred stealth fighters within a single decade, significantly altering the quantitative balance of advanced combat aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region.

    Shenyang Aerospace City Factory Points to J-35 Mass Production

    Construction of a large new manufacturing complex in Shenyang dedicated to the J-35 series indicates that China is preparing to move the aircraft from low-rate production into full-scale manufacturing intended to support both land-based and carrier-based variants. The new facility covers more than 370,000 square metres and includes a dedicated 3,660-metre runway, a configuration that allows immediate testing and flight validation of newly produced aircraft without requiring transfer to separate airfields. Existing Shenyang assembly lines that previously focused on fourth-generation fighters such as the J-15 and J-16 are reportedly being reconfigured to support fifth-generation production, allowing the company to maintain output while transitioning to newer platforms. State-linked reporting indicates that the Shenyang Aerospace City project is part of a larger 79.2-square-kilometre industrial complex designed to support full-chain aircraft manufacturing, including component fabrication, assembly, testing, and delivery within a single integrated site. Chinese sources state that the facility is expected to double the company’s total warplane production capacity within three to five years, a target consistent with Western estimates of rapidly increasing fighter output across multiple aircraft programs.

    Video released by official channels showing unpainted green-primer J-35 aircraft positioned on the runway has been interpreted by analysts as evidence of fresh production rather than prototype testing, indicating that assembly lines are already operating at meaningful capacity. The dual-variant concept for the J-35, with separate configurations for air force and naval aviation use, suggests that production planning is based on large fleet requirements rather than limited carrier deployment needs. The presence of a dedicated runway at the manufacturing complex further implies that production rates are expected to reach levels requiring continuous flight testing, a characteristic normally associated with high-volume output programs.

    Production Capacity Could Reach 300–400 Fighters Per Year

    Combined output from Chengdu and Shenyang facilities could allow China’s aerospace industry to reach a total fighter and attack aircraft production capacity estimated at between 300 and 400 aircraft per year, with a minimum sustained level of roughly 250 according to Western analysis. Such figures would exceed the annual output of any individual Western fighter program, including the F-35 production line, which has historically reached maximum yearly deliveries of approximately 156 aircraft under optimal conditions. A manufacturing capacity of this scale would allow China to replace older aircraft while simultaneously expanding the number of stealth platforms in service, reducing the need to choose between modernisation and fleet growth. The ability to sustain high-volume production also improves operational flexibility by allowing new regiments to be equipped without requiring the retirement of existing units, accelerating the overall transition to fifth-generation capability. Large-scale industrial output further provides the option to introduce upgraded variants without disrupting force expansion, ensuring that technological improvements do not slow the rate of deployment.

    cont’d in response

    • Tervell [he/him]@hexbear.net
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      Analysts note that the combination of multiple factories, parallel assembly lines, and integrated supply chains reduces vulnerability to production interruptions, allowing steady output even if individual facilities face delays or modifications. This manufacturing model reflects a strategy aimed at long-term force generation rather than short-term procurement cycles, consistent with planning timelines extending toward 2030 and beyond. The scale of the current expansion indicates that China is preparing for sustained high-tempo aircraft production over many years, rather than a temporary increase tied to a single procurement program.

      ah, the wonders of actual economic planning instead of just doing a constant will-they-won’t-they between the military and industry year after year

      Fleet Projections Suggest 1,000 Stealth Fighters by 2030

      *Assessments based on current production rates indicate that the number of J-20 aircraft in service has grown from roughly 50 in 2020 to around 300 by late 2025, with more than thirteen PLAAF regiments reportedly operating the aircraft. If production continues at the estimated level of roughly 100 to 120 aircraft per year, the total number of J-20 variants in service could approach one thousand by the end of the decade, depending on the rate at which older aircraft are retired. The J-35 remains in early production, but analysts expect output to increase rapidly once assembly lines reach full capacity, following a pattern seen in previous Chinese aircraft programs. The existence of both carrier-based and land-based versions of the J-35 suggests that the aircraft is intended to equip multiple branches of the armed forces, increasing total production requirements significantly. Parallel production of J-20 and J-35 variants allows China to expand both air-superiority and carrier aviation capabilities simultaneously, avoiding the trade-offs normally associated with limited industrial capacity. The projected fleet size would allow China to field a large number of fifth-generation fighters across several theatres, including mainland defence, maritime operations, and carrier strike group support. Such numbers would represent one of the largest concentrations of stealth aircraft in the world, giving planners the option to distribute forces widely without reducing local airpower density. These projections remain estimates based on observed infrastructure and production trends, as official figures on aircraft output are not publicly released.

      Chinese Media Signals Confidence Without Confirming Numbers

      Chinese state and official media outlets have not disclosed exact production figures but have repeatedly highlighted new aircraft flights, factory activity, and infrastructure expansion, framing these developments as routine progress rather than an extraordinary surge. Reports have described the J-35 program as entering a stage of large-scale production supported by intelligent manufacturing systems designed to increase efficiency and reduce assembly time. Official commentary has emphasised the concept of one aircraft with multiple variants, suggesting that production planning is based on a family of platforms rather than a single configuration. Footage released by official broadcasters showing multiple J-20A aircraft in coordinated test flights has been interpreted by analysts as evidence that upgraded versions are being produced alongside earlier models. Statements from industry figures have described the current phase of aircraft development as unprecedented in scale, indicating that both production and testing activities are occurring simultaneously. Media coverage has focused on demonstrations, maiden flights, and carrier trials rather than numerical output, maintaining the traditional opacity associated with military programs. The absence of official denial regarding Western estimates has been noted by analysts as indirect confirmation that production capacity is indeed increasing. Social-media accounts linked to aerospace organisations have shared images of newly built aircraft and factory construction, reinforcing the perception of expanding industrial capability without providing detailed statistics.

    • MaoShanDong [he/him]@hexbear.net
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      There was some discussion of this article on reddit and from my understanding most credible pla watchers think this is actually an underestimation of current pla capabilities with j-20 counts alone being around 500 at this point. This is based off of serial numbers seen at airshows in the past year which indicate the current j-20 floor being at least 300 iirc.