Iranian air defense systems have successfully reduced military aggression by American and Israeli fighter jets in the central regions of the country after the F-35 aircraft was struck, a highly-placed intelligence source told Press TV.

According to the source, Iran’s advanced and integrated air defense network has inflicted multiple blows against enemy invading aircraft, forcing a decrease in the tempo of operations over central Iran.

“The multiple strikes by Iran’s integrated air defense system against American and Israeli invading aircraft have led to a significant reduction in military operations by American and Israeli fighter jets in the central regions of the country,” the source said.

The source further noted that the enemy had focused on harassment and terrorist actions in central Iran but has so far failed to achieve its objectives.

“After striking the F-35, the pace of military operations has decreased, although aircraft and drones are still being used for reconnaissance purposes,” he added.

The intelligence source also revealed that the number of downed drones has reached nearly 200. Citing defensive innovations deployed against enemy aircraft, he said the rate of strikes against enemy warplanes is likely to increase in the coming days.

“Given the defensive innovations against enemy aircraft, it appears that in the coming days, the rate of strikes against enemy warplanes will increase,” the source said.

On March 19, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) aerospace division struck the crown jewel of the US Air Force – the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter – irrevocably reshaping the strategic calculus of the ongoing US-Israeli aggression, as per experts.

For nearly two decades, the F-35 program stood as the pinnacle of American military dominance – a multi-trillion-dollar, fifth-generation platform designed to pierce the world’s most advanced air defenses with total impunity.

That myth was shattered over the skies of central Iran, where the IRGC deployed the domestically built air defense system to expose vulnerabilities of the F-35 aircraft.

As the aggression enters its fourth week, Iran’s integrated air defense network has not only endured the heaviest aerial bombardment but has systematically dismantled the technological arrogance of the US-Israeli war machine.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq unfolded under logistical conditions so permissive they bordered on ideal: secure staging areas in Kuwait, rapid air dominance, and supply lines that flowed with minimal interference. Even then, the war proved long and costly. A campaign against Iran would enjoy none of those advantages. From the first hours, every regional port, airfield, and convoy would be vulnerable to missiles, drones, and proxy threats. Layered air defenses, mountainous chokepoints, and dispersed urban battles would turn sustainment into the decisive—and potentially decisive—constraint. Logistics that enabled maneuver in Iraq would become a grinding, attritional battle for survival in Iran. U.S. and coalition forces must fully account for these realities before committing boots to the ground: the ease of Iraq cannot be assumed, and under these conditions, failure to secure supply lines or maintain operational tempo could be catastrophic. In short, Iraq was the easy version. A ground campaign against Iran would be the real one: a prolonged, high-casualty sustainment fight in which the ability to keep forces supplied under constant attack would determine whether the operation could even continue.

Logistics Then Versus Now

Logistics would be the decisive constraint in any attempt to invade Iran. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. forces operated under unusually favorable sustainment conditions. Secure staging areas in Kuwait and other regional partners provided established ports, airfields, and logistical infrastructure that enabled the rapid buildup of combat power before the ground offensive began. Fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements flowed through relatively secure ground lines of communication, allowing commanders to maintain operational momentum during the opening phase of the campaign. Coalition air forces also quickly degraded Iraqi air defenses and command networks, establishing dominance of the airspace and enabling persistent close air support, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation. The result was a logistical environment that allowed maneuver units to operate with comparatively reliable sustainment and very limited disruption.

A Battlespace Without Sanctuary

A campaign against Iran would begin under far less permissive conditions. Unlike Iraq in 2003, there are no comparable staging zones immune from immediate retaliation. Any regional bases, ports, or airfields used to support an invasion would likely fall within range of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones from the outset of hostilities. Supply lines would therefore begin the war exposed and contested rather than protected and predictable. The early assumption of uncontested airspace would also be far less certain. Iran fields layered air defense systems and long-range fires capable of threatening aircraft, forward operating bases, and aerial logistics hubs. Establishing reliable air superiority across a country of Iran’s size would take time, during which ground forces and supply convoys would operate under persistent risk.

Advanced Missiles and Drones Put Logistics in the Crosshairs

Precision fires and loitering munitions could transform the battlefield into a constant logistical crisis. Iran possesses a substantial ballistic missile inventory, including the Shahab, Emad, and Khorramshahr families, capable of striking regional bases, ports, airfields, and supply hubs that invading forces rely on. In addition, Iran fields advanced drones such as the Shahed attack series and Arash-2 loitering munitions, which can strike with precision, conduct extended surveillance, and coordinate with other systems to maximize effect. These capabilities extend Iran’s operational reach while simultaneously constraining an invader’s freedom of movement, complicating logistics, and exposing forces to persistent, unpredictable threats—forcing planners to account for attrition and disruption before combat even begins, a level of persistent threat that U.S. forces did not face in Iraq.

Cheap Drones, Expensive Consequences

On the modern battlefield, inexpensive drones have dramatically increased the speed and scale of lethal attacks, as seen in Ukraine. Unlike the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by insurgents in Iraq, which were manual, painstaking, and slow, requiring days of surveillance, digging, wiring, and observation, small drones can be cheaply deployed in large numbers almost immediately. They can surveil, guide artillery, or deliver explosive payloads directly against troops and supply convoys, dramatically increasing both the tempo and scale of attacks. Each strike carries the potential to inflict casualties, degrade morale, and disrupt supply chains, creating a persistent, multi-directional threat that invading forces in Iraq never faced and which fundamentally reshapes tactical planning in modern combat.

Regional Escalation and Proxy Warfare

The broader regional environment further complicates the logistical picture. Iran maintains established relationships with proxy forces and partner militias across the Middle East, including Hezbollah and numerous Shiite militias operating in Iraq. In the event of a major conflict, these groups could conduct coordinated attacks against supply lines, staging areas, and forward operating bases across the region. Such activity would expand the battlespace beyond Iran’s borders and force commanders to allocate combat power to protect logistics infrastructure rather than concentrate entirely on offensive operations.

From Fallujah to Tehran: The Multicity Challenge

Geography and population density further favor the defender. Iran has roughly twice the population of Iraq and nearly four times the territory. While Iraq’s population in 2003 was concentrated in a handful of key urban centers such as Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul, Iran’s population is distributed across multiple large metropolitan areas including Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz. Each represents a separate and complex urban battlespace filled with dense civilian populations, industrial zones, and extensive transportation networks. For an invading force, this fragmentation multiplies operational objectives while simultaneously complicating logistics and command coordination. Urban combat in Iran would likely exceed the intensity seen in battles such as the Second Battle of Fallujah or the Battle of Mosul. Operations of that scale could occur simultaneously across several major cities,

unlimited Battles of Stalingrad upon the empire’s military

forcing commanders to disperse forces while sustaining multiple urban campaigns at once, all while U.S. and coalition forces would potentially face advanced missiles, precision-guided drones, larger explosive warheads, and a lack of the secure rear-area logistics network they enjoyed in Iraq. Such operations are manpower intensive, logistically demanding, and historically associated with high casualty rates.

The Iraq War Was the Easy Version

Even under the relatively favorable conditions of Iraq, the war proved costly. Over the course of the conflict, the United States lost roughly 7,000 service members killed in action and tens of thousands wounded. Those losses came despite secure staging areas, less concentrated population centers, and permissive terrain—demonstrating that even optimal logistics and rear-area security cannot eliminate combat losses. Against Iran, those same advantages would not exist. Sustaining large ground forces across a far larger and more contested battlespace while under threat from missiles, drones, proxy attacks, and complex terrain would place extraordinary strain on logistics systems. Under such conditions, operational tempo would slow, supply networks would remain under constant pressure, and casualties would likely rise far higher than the U.S has seen in decades of war. From a logistics perspective, the invasion of Iraq increasingly appears to have been a best-case scenario. A ground campaign against Iran would almost certainly resemble the opposite: a prolonged, highly contested sustainment fight in which operational success depends less on maneuver speed and more on the ability to keep forces supplied under constant attack. A ground campaign against Iran would represent a far more severe test of American logistics: a grueling, high-casualty struggle for sustainment and endurance in which failing to keep forces supplied under constant fire could end the campaign before it ever truly begins. Policymakers must treat logistics not as an afterthought, but as the decisive constraint—before any decision to commit boots on the ground.