seaposting [none/use name]

Posting about a sea

  • 2 Posts
  • 55 Comments
Joined 8 months ago
cake
Cake day: May 9th, 2025

help-circle
  • Vietnam is already seen as part of the Sino world, only Westerners think otherwise. The (derogatory?) implications of being cast as Southeast Asian is noted though - very typical for these sort of commentators.

    In reality Southeast Asia doesn’t exist, and even if it did, it’d be split into three parts, Maritime Southeast Asia (Nusantara/the Malay World), Mainland Southeast Asia (buddhist regions stretching from Burma to Laos), and Vietnam. This is due to history. Only international school kids and liberals think of themselves as “southeast asian”. I use it purely as a geographical marker but without claim to any pretensions of a larger cultural unity.

    Thailand’s manufacturing industry is suffering but it is still the second largest in the Southeast Asia. The main point of contention is this recency bias - “factionalism of the past 20-30years” - which showcases the sort of fake analysis so common these days. It may sound profound but doesn’t actually tell you much. Like saying “just pursue manufacturing bro”.

    Questions people should be asking:

    • what was different about Thailand’s industrial policy from the other Asian tigers?
    • Why did tourism become the main source of livelihoods, especially in rural areas and the islands?
    • What were the class structures that influenced the behaviour of state, industrial and financial capital throughout 20th and 21st century Thailand?
    • What was the role of China, the world bank and IMF in the Asian Financial Crisis that affected Thailand first?

    Vietnam is likely to become the last country in the world to go from poor to developed

    ???

    OP is basing “poor” and “development” just on GDP per capita figures and thinks that is be end and end all of “development”. But I can’t expect much from someone who the day before was doing psychoanalysis about Maduro having to switch from a life of luxury to living in US prisons and implying he might suicide lol and that instead of being addicted to power you should just become a merchant (the irony of someone saying that an advocating for manufacturing is not lost on me).

    It’s all vibes based analysis from these people.


  • Anwar’s statement

    I have followed developments in Venezuela with grave concern. The leader of Venezuela and his wife were seized in a United States military operation of unusual scope and nature. Such actions constitute a clear violation of international law and amount to an unlawful use of force against a sovereign state.

    President Maduro and his wife must be released without any undue delay. Whatever may be the reasons, the forcible removal of a sitting head of government through external action sets a dangerous precedent. It erodes fundamental restraints on the use of power between states and weakens the legal framework that underpins international order.

    It is for the people of Venezuela to determine their own political future. As history has shown, abrupt changes in leadership brought about through external force will bring more harm than good, what more in a country already grappling with prolonged economic hardship and deep social strain.

    Malaysia regards respect for international law and sovereignty as paramount to peaceful relations between states. Constructive engagement, dialogue and de-escalation remain the most credible path towards an outcome that protects civilians and allows Venezuelans to pursue their legitimate aspirations without further harm.

    This response is expected for anyone bothered to read the country’s history in the last 50 years instead of repeating old retellings of anti-communist things that happened 70 years ago.

    Westerners mad that global south countries do not recognize unilateral sanctions nor care about liberal antics. Personally, I applaud the industrious and entrepreneurial spirit of all the people involved in the transhipment of Venezeulan and Iranian oil in Malaysian waters.



  • ‘Dead’ town: At Kelantan-Thailand border, Malaysia’s drug war unsettles residents, businesses

    Malaysia is building both walls and bridges along its porous northern border with Thailand, determined to deter rampant smuggling while boosting economic ties. In the first of a two-part series, CNA explores how Malaysia is preventing illicit goods from reaching its shores, and the ground impact of these efforts.

    Context being the Northern rural states also have the highest drug addiction rates in the country. Economic development and curtailing flow forms part of the strategy to eradicate substance (mis)use since the border up North is where most drugs enter Peninsular Malaysia.

    New border bridge, rail link: Malaysia, Thailand eye deeper economic ties in border regions, but hurdles remain

    In the second of a two-part series, CNA looks at joint economic projects in the pipeline, and how political and security challenges might scupper them.

    There’s video versions of the articles aswell. Very hefty articles, providing accounts from officials and locals from both sides of the border, talking about the economy, building walls, bridges, railway, bombings and smuggling. The counter-insurgency narrative is a given for something coming from Mediacorp, but the history of the BRN (National Revolutionary Front) and the role of (political) Islam in the Southern Thai provinces and Northern Malaysian states is too much to talk about here.

    Random things I found interesting

    “Malaysians are coming to the Thai border towns and purchasing chicken burgers until the shelves are empty,” he said, his voice tinged with astonishment as he referred to the ready-to-eat snack easily prepared in a microwave.

    When my family visited Thailand last month, they brought over atleast like 12 of these burgers. The fridge was full of them. They do taste pretty good - slightly better than the McDonald ones, and about 1usd each so way cheaper. Didn’t realize it was a trendy thing to do.

    As for transportation links, Malaysia and Thailand have agreed to revive the Bangkok-Butterworth train service on the west coast. There is also talk of extending Malaysia’s upcoming East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) to Thailand via Rantau Panjang and Sungai Golok.

    If the new double tracking proposals for Thailand’s Southern provinces comes through, this will leave the last bottleneck of the Singapore-Kunming line resolved (…by 2031).


  • The limits of reform: 2025 Malaysia news roundup

    Malaysia’s Prime Minister is more akin to that of Lula, but this may not seem immediately obvious due to the nature of the respective countries in the capitalist world economy. The centrist coalition, incapable at mobilising structural changes in the economy, resorts to small reforms to stitch over the wounds while delaying the inevitable.

    Increases in the minimum wage, instituting a voluntary progressive wage policy and civil servant salary raises were parts of the government’s policy in improving salaries after decades of continual stagnation. Greater push for TVET education and gradual educational reform, with emphasis on STEM and trilingual mastery of Malay, English and Mandarin, has continuously been the government’s strategy in marketing the labour force to international capital. Malaysia has one of the highest % of STEM graduates in Southeast Asia, with about 40% according to some sources. Enrolment has reached 51%, with the government long-term goal being 60%. Coupled with this is record highs in cash handout spending to lower income households in 2025, funded through fuel subsidy rationalisation.

    The government has continuously pursued a reduction of the fiscal deficit, as emphasized in the 13th Malaysia Plan (the 2026-2030 5-year plan). Personally, it seems like local conversations and media has finally shifted from scaremongering about the deficit the past couple years, recognising that the government’s exposure to foreign-denominated debt has always been low (<3%), with overall public sector external debt being ~10%.

    The high-profile case involving Former Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, has reached it’s conclusion with a 15-year jail time and a RM11.38b ($2.8b) fine due to his role in the 1MDB corruption scandal. That said, some major actors remain free and other people involved were able to avoid harsh penalties, questioning the government’s ability and willingness to root out corruption.

    The signing of the US-Malaysia ART, widely criticised for being unbalanced and unfavourable to Malaysia, was also signed. Among the provisions that were critiqued include those forcing Malaysia to conform to US rare earth supply chains, acceptance of US Halal certification standards, and a clause involving unilateral tariffs against US enemies.

    Law Reform

    A constitutional court ruling has decided that the Federal government had not given Malaysia’s poorest state, Sabah, with the highest absolute poverty rate of 17.7% compared to the national rate of 5.1%, on what it was entitled - 40% of oil and gas revenues from the national O&G company, Petronas. The company will predictably contribute about 18% of the entire government budget in 2026 but has had reached highs of 40% in the past couple decades.

    The Gig Workers Bill was passed, extending basic workers rights to all those working under platforms, namely Grab and Foodpanda. The amendment to the Employees’ Social Security bill also now means workers have 24-hour coverage for comprehensive social protection, including accidents and injuries outside of working hours.

    The federal court has also struck down a provision that penalized organizers with up to a RM10,000 ($2500) fine if they failed to notify the police before a public rally.

    Other various tidbits

    Malaysia has overtaken Thailand since 2024 to become the most visited country in Southeast Asia, with preliminary assessments indicating more than 40 million visitors in 2025, with 2026 plan’s seeing the government’s target rise to 47 million. Foreign and domestic tourist spending has exceeded 2019 levels.

    The Malaysian Ringgit has reached a nearly 5 year high against the dollar, trading at around 4.04-4.06. Trade has also risen to it’s highest level ever, with RM1.45t ($358b) in exports by November. This means a record consecutive export surplus of 67 months since May 2020, and leading to another yearly surplus since 1998.

    Looking at various statistics on OpenDOSM, the government’s bid for a fully transparent platform of free, regularly updated and open data unifying sources from all government agencies, does imply some ‘progress’.

    For example, FDI

    Conclusion

    All in all, 2025 was marked by competence by the national bourgeois dictatorship, further cementing Malaysia’s role and reliance on the global economy. Mixtures of neoliberal, and progressive policies further complicate Malaysia’s future trajectory. 2026 will be a pivotal year in assessing ASEAN’s role in the global economy, whether it can successfully build South-South cooperation and retain unity and resilience from ongoing geopolitical fragmentation. Ongoing adherence to neoliberal capitalism limits future imaginations, continues enabling the desecration of class politics into technocratic managerial politics of “good governance”. The political Left remains practically non-existent in this suffocating existence, with the necessary work continuously and slowly being built by those on the ground.

    That’s all, and happy new years everyone.


  • I share similar fears, but what can China do that it hasn’t already done?

    As much as the sabre-rattling of China’s incursions in the contested South China Sea is amplified, China does not have the precedence of military deployments as the USA has in their neighbouring regions.

    I think local developments will have to shift before any sort of overt policy change comes into play. The militaries of Southeast Asian countries are generally more reactionary and anti-China than the populace, any sort of official movement of China’s military may lead to unnecessary antagonisms elsewhere.

    Simple narratives of interference by China is already widespread. I think their focus on the economy and diplomacy has carried itself to good graces for most of Southeast Asia so far. It’s about bread and butter issues for the populace in the end- China has the economic weight that Russia does not.


  • South-east Asia’s broken east flank in Indochina: Myanmar’s problem

    I don’t agree with everything the author says, his commentary is quite typical of ASEAN non-alignment, with some (mild) anti-China sentiments abound but not typically to the level of the West.

    Choice quotes below.

    The scale of China’s dependence on Myanmar reveals the depth of this transformation.

    In 2023, Myanmar became China’s largest external supplier of heavy rare earth elements such as dysprosium and terbium—critical inputs for electric vehicles, advanced electronics, and modern weapons systems.

    China imported roughly 41,700 metric tons that year, accounting for more than 90 percent of its heavy rare earth supply.

    Yet these minerals do not come from areas controlled by the central government in Naypyidaw.

    They are extracted almost entirely from territories governed by ethnic armed organisations in Kachin and northern Shan States.

    …[China] does not secure its supply chains in Myanmar by choosing between the junta and the resistance, or by waiting for an elusive national peace. Instead, it works with whoever governs the ground that matters.

    Central institutions in Beijing handle formal diplomacy, sovereign agreements, and military-to-military ties with Naypyidaw. At the same time, provincial security and intelligence agencies based in Yunnan manage relations with ethnic armed organisations along the border. These local agencies possess decades of experience, granular intelligence, and practical leverage that central ministries lack.

    …Yet this strategy carries grave risks.

    The more China relies on armed groups to secure its interests, the more it erodes the authority of the central state.

    If Naypyidaw weakens beyond a critical threshold, Myanmar could slide into total state collapse. Such an outcome would not serve China’s interests.

    …China is therefore engaged in a delicate balancing act: weakening the state enough to ensure compliance, but not so much that it disintegrates. It is betting that permanent fragmentation can be managed indefinitely.

    For South-east Asia, this is a sobering lesson. Indochina’s eastern flank is no longer simply contested by great powers; it is being reorganised around corridors, commodities, and controlled disorder.

    Traditional notions of sovereignty and non-interference are increasingly misaligned with realities on the ground.

    …The real question is no longer who will rule Myanmar — but whether the region can prevent fragmentation from becoming the default model of order.



  • Asean economies head into 2026 on a strong note

    Graphs in the actual website.

    Resilience and strength in regional exports

    Evidence mounts that supply chain realignment is generating an increase in intra-regional trade and benefiting Asean exports. This momentum is particularly evident in regional economies plugged into the artificial intelligence (AI) and electronics supply chain.

    For instance, Malaysia and Singapore both experienced a strong jump in exports, led by the electronics and semiconductor sector. Persistent global AI-related capital expenditure has created a clear “halo effect”, transmitting stronger demand across the entire electronics value chain as the AI replacement cycle intensifies.

    Regional currencies defy expectations

    Second is the strength in South-east Asian regional currencies. At the start of the year, there was widespread fear that intense US tariffs against China and Asean would cause export contraction across the region. This could lead to pronounced US dollar strength or, worse, a synchronised devaluation of the yuan and regional currencies.

    The reality was markedly different. Given that Asean economies have a large export component, strong export performance bolstered regional currencies. This was magnified by the underlying global trend of de-dollarisation, which intensified across the year.

    Benign inflation trajectory across the region

    Investors were also worried that the higher trade tariffs would spike inflation globally. However, supply chains in various industries proved more flexible than expected, with many intermediaries helping to absorb the tariffs. This meant limited passthrough of higher prices to end-consumers.

    Strong currencies across Asean also increased purchasing power, dampening imported inflation risks. Furthermore, the influx of competitively priced goods and services from China helped drive down manufacturing costs, keeping inflation in check. As a result, most inflation trajectories across Asean economies remained soft.

    …While most regional currencies performed well, the dong and rupiah remained weak. Specifically, the weak rupiah was cited as a key factor for Bank Indonesia in its decision to refrain from further rate cuts. Meanwhile, the Prabowo government remains focused on its various stimulus measures to push Indonesia’s economic growth rate beyond the current 5 per cent handle.

    On the inflation front, Thailand faces increasing deflationary risk with the headline consumer price index falling 0.76 per cent in October, intensifying the 0.72 per cent contraction in September. The trend is fuelled by supply side forces and soft underlying demand…

    In another article,

    Another obstacle is the middle-income trap: Thailand’s average income remains about US$7,500 per capita, far below the US$13,000 threshold for high-income status.

    Furthermore, business and industrial models largely generate low value-added output. At current growth rates, Thailand may need 30–40 years to become a high-income nation and risks having its GDP overtaken by Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines in the coming years.




  • Rainbow Agrarian Populism – On Phue Thai

    The Phue Thai Party have always been a headache for the overly literate classes.For the governing elites of Thailand, they are a constant threat, a powerful force of both capital and mobilised dedicated supporters. For academics, they defy definition. Political scientists, time and again, fail to categorise them— being both a peasant-backed leftist populist movement and an alliance of big urban capitalists, they break too many rules. For economists, they cannot resolve the contradictions of a party that privatises some elements of state infrastructure while simultaneously investing massive sums of capital in building and owning other elements. They are somehow nationalist and judicially punitive yet wokeand socially progressive all at once. Phue Thai bring both green-cap-wearing communists and luxury-watch-wearing real estate moguls into the same coalition. By all the rules of 21st-century politics, they should not exist, they should not be possible, but somehow they have been capable of creating this oft-misunderstood paradigm shift.

    As the mood of the global south increasingly shifts towards a new paradigm, with the development of BRICS, the re-alignment of trade away from US-centric markets and new calls for economic sovereignty, states like Burkina Faso, Mexico and China are experimenting with new models that break from the political science textbooks. In many ways, Phue Thai’s vision was ahead of its time, with its golden years running between 2001-2006, yet the party is still alive today, affording us an insight into another potential future, another paradigm.

    Below is a very short excerpt on the long-form article, highlighting the introduction and the conclusion of the article.

    excerpt

    Origins

    Since the birth of the modern Thai political settlement, at the time of the Sarit coup-d’etat in 1957, power in the Kingdom has, to this day, been conserved by a narrow, interconnected elite: the military, the monarchy, and an aristocracy-aligned old-money business faction. This alliance, which was designed for the Cold War, remained in place following the withdrawal of Beijing’s support for overseas communist parties and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In short, the reactionary necessity in which it was born is long obsolete. Today, it serves as a state apparatus that can only be described as slow, clientelist, bureaucratic, and fundamentally incapable of facilitating economic movement or even modernisation. The bloat of the regime could be seen most clearly in the capital of Bangkok, a city which had mushroomed well beyond its capacity, sucking in wealth and labour— creating an economic vacuum in much of the rest of the country. While Bangkok opened its skytrain at the turn of the new millennium, virtually no other inner cities even had local bus routes.

    The first real crisis this coalition faced post-Cold War was the 1997 ‘Tom Yum Goong’ financial crash, which exposed the administrative incompetence of the traditional elite and created the opportunity for a new cohort of domestic national capitalists to step forward. This faction identified the old state as an obstacle to profit, demanding the state engage in economic modernisation and efficiency, as well as developing the maligned outer provinces by spreading the wealth from Bangkok outwards. This was the birth of Phue Thai.

    …The new coalition came about under Thaksin Shinawatra, an elite capitalist from the outer provinces who had made his fortune in Communications during the tech boom of the 90s. The party was initially founded as Thai Rak Thai. The key to its success was forging a genuine, if atypical, network of class collaboration. The economic imperative of the new bourgeoisie aligned perfectly with the material needs of the masses, creating a unified base against the bloated military-aristocratic network. Thaksin pieced together the foundations for his party with a wide range of political actors from military officers, elite business people, former communist insurgents and western-educated academics…

    On Experimentation Contradictions

    …Socialism is about changing the economic system; in the 21st century, that is going to take some experimentation. Conditions today are not those of 1917, and as such require strange experiments and unlikely alliances— as they did then. Those who struggle and fail to define Phue Thai do so because of that experimentation. They don’t fit the end-of-history model, instead they offer an alternative. While this alternative is compromised and is a form of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, it can still be seen as a stepping stone for mass mobilisation while simultaneously putting food on the plates of workers.

    This experiment, through rearranging and redirecting, if not exactly redistributing, the economy via class collaboration, creates the conditions for a higher state of class consciousness. Thaksin and the bourgeois elements of Phue Thai are often accused of cynically using the poor to suit their personal political interest, but why shouldn’t we perceive it as that way round? This writer would argue that we can afford the poor the recognition to argue that it is just as likely that they are using Thaksin and his bourgeois allies to build some kind of socialism— albeit one without any of the symbolism of red stars and busts of Marx. Perhaps that is why the overly literate classes fail time and time again to recognise Phue Thai’s liberatory potential.

    Like it or not, Phue Thai are the only force within Thailand capable of creating new paradigms, and as such, they are currently the only force with the capacity to challenge that old reactionary vanguard. Their success is a testament to the power of strategic alliances and mass mobilisation— one could also call it truly radical pragmatism. As the mood of the Global South continues to develop, so too does our analysis and response. Like we said in the introduction, the Phue Thai of the early 2000s were somehow well ahead of their time. In many ways, the new experiments in governing within the Global South are only now catching up with Phue Thai, and this is an experiment that we as socialists need to be a part of.


  • Fragmenting The Ummah: How And Why The Malay Neocolony Disrupts Islamic Unity

    Although race gets the focus of most analyses over here, important distinctions can also be made through class-based differences on religion and language. Below is the introduction. I also generally recommend the website VoxUmmah where the article was published, especially for those curious on the Islamicate and anti-imperialism.

    A few months ago, during a conversation regarding global and local politics, my Maoist friend was surprised to hear me say that Hadi Awang, the current president of the controversial Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), had expressed support for Iran’s struggle against Israel. His shock was due to the widespread chronic online assumption that the president was a Shia-hating Salafi. This, however, is far from reality. A quick internet search would reveal that Hadi Awang has many times, through speeches and written statements, affirmed that the Shia, although considered outside the creed of Ahlul Sunnah wal Jama’ah, are still within the fold of Islam. He even stated in a video once that Shias are welcome to join PAS as members, provided they understood that the usul of the party’s constitution remains as the Quran, followed by the Sunnah, ijma’, and qiyas, thereby reiterating that the party adopts Shafi’i jurisprudence, in line with the historically normative practice of the Malays.

    the rest of the introduction

    Besides affirming the Muslimhood of the Shia, Hadi Awang has for a long time shown great support for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In his regularly published column Minda Presiden, which is available on the party’s news site, he has, on several occasions, highlighted the necessity of unity within the ummah. He considers it essential in the struggle against US imperialism, the great enemy of Islam in our time. He has even gone a step beyond to speak positively about the republic’s state ideology: the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilayah al-faqih). He likens it to the party’s own governance model known as the Leadership of the Scholars (kepimpinan ulama), which was first conceptualised by PAS’s youth leaders in 1982, some years after the Iranian Revolution. It is no secret that the Iranian Revolution had reinvigorated Islamic politics in Malaysia, as it did in the rest of the world. As recently as this year, PAS’s youth wing held a protest near the US embassy in response to Israeli missile attacks on Iranian civilians.

    So how is it that my friend seems to have a drastically different expectation of Hadi Awang’s attitude towards sectarianism, given that Shia-Sunni unity has been and continues to be a no-brainer to party leadership? This has to do with the party’s recent track record of appealing to racist ethnonationalist sentiment in their political messaging, reinforcing the status quo of Malay supremacy and contributing to the polarisation between Malays and non-Malays. This behaviour, however, contradicts a public statement made by Hadi Awang himself in 1985 that the party had no intentions of defending Malay special rights as they deemed it an un-Islamic concept. Yet the party’s attitude today reflects none of that. They have even been silent on the plight of the Rohingyas since 2020, despite being among the Islamic groups that popularised the issue before that, simply because the general Malay population today views Rohingya refugees negatively. This contradictory trajectory may seem peculiar at first glance, but it becomes clear once understood within the context of how Malay(sia) and neocolonialism have historically shaped Islam and Malayness.


  • Background on the Thailand-Cambodia War

    This was written in the first bout of the war in July, but it’s heft corresponds to it’s insight, highlighting the political-economic history of the two respective countries which continuously remains relevant.

    On the morning of July 25, war broke out between Cambodia and Thailand. On the surface, the conflict was sparked by a dispute over control of a UNESCO-listed heritage temple along the contested border. In reality, however, this war has little to do with the temple itself, nor is it truly a battle between two nations. Rather, it is the result of domestic political decisions on both sides, decisions that ultimately amount to a war on the poor, regardless of which side of the border they are from. In this conflict, peace is the only class based solution.

    Selected excerpts

    Yet this orchestrated persecution only confirms the Shinawatra family’s long-held conviction: Thailand’s establishment will tolerate pro-poor reforms only when it lacks the means to block them. Their strategy, enduring judicial harassment and public vilification while safeguarding incremental gains, is not weakness, but a pragmatic understanding of asymmetric political warfare.

    For all its flaws, Pheu Thai remains the sole political vehicle capable of challenging Thailand’s military-monarchy complex, the entrenched power structure that has governed unchecked since the Cold War. This latest crisis is another battle in a century-long class war, one where every challenge to the elite status quo by the rural poor has been met with coups, judicial overthrows, or, as now, manufactured scandals. As of early July, the kingdom stands at another precipice: whether the remnants of the coalition can limp on, or whether the tanks will roll again in another coup remains uncertain, though the latter is increasingly likely as, on the 25th of July, the military declared martial law in 8 provinces near the border. What’s undeniable is that the real casualties will be, as always, Thailand’s working class.

    It didn’t have to be this way. When Vietnamese forces, along with exiled Cambodians made up of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation liberated Phnom Penh in January 1979, they launched one of the most ambitious post-genocide reconstruction projects in modern history. Vietnamese engineers restored Phnom Penh’s water and electricity within weeks; medical teams vaccinated over two million Cambodians against polio and other diseases; and agricultural collectives revived food production. Assistance from Hanoi’s administration and the hard work of the Cambodian people laid foundations and literacy rates rose from 5% to 88% by 1987. A new generation of Cambodian teachers, doctors and civil servants, many trained in Vietnam, began rebuilding their shattered society…

    …Cambodia is a product of UNTAC’s 90s “end of history” free market fever experiment. The state abdicated its role in providing social care and basic infrastructure to the market, supplemented by a vast international aid program (the largest ever in dollar amount at its time). Today though, as aid funds dry up, the state finds itself completely lacking the capacity to function. Very few levers are left for Hun Sen, and his successor son Hun Manet, to pull to address the country’s social and economic crises.

    The “transition” from father to son merely formalises what UNTAC set in motion: capitalism without development and genocide survivors as disposable labour. Thirty years after the UN promised peace, Cambodia’s proletariat remains trapped between the Khmer Rouge’s killing fields and the sweatshops.

    At the onset of this war Cambodia’s economy is hemorrhaging from self-inflicted wounds by the elite classes and global market shocks. The garment sector, 40% of GDP and a direct legacy of UNTAC’s sweatshop model, collapsed as Western brands fled, with 90 factories shuttering and 85,000 workers laid off in the past year alone. Foreign direct investment cratered by 32%, while youth unemployment hit 18.4%, a time bomb in a median-age-25 population. The riel (currency) is in freefall, inflation hit 4.5% despite stagnant wages, and 1.2 million Cambodians now survive on under $1.90/day as rice exports dwindle under elite land grabs…

    …This war is not about a temple. It has also been misinterpreted as a scrap between Hun Sen and The Shinawatras, some kind of 4D chess game between the US and China or simple nationalist grandstanding. It is none of those. This war is the outcome of a decades-long project of anti-communism on both sides of the border, a war against the poor, fought by the poor as commanded by the elite. Both the US and China have called for peace– along with almost every other state in the region. Those who attempt to paint it as Chinese meddling in Southeast Asia obviously try to do so in bad faith, both parties have accepted some Belt and Road funding, bought some weapons, etc. While those inclined to see this as some kind of US instigated conflict completely fail to see the woods through the trees.

    Yes, ultimately it was the US pax-Americana project that birthed these repressive state apparatuses decades ago, but today little direct interference remains beyond the “free” markets they left behind, along with their unexploded ordinance and incalculable trauma. To point the finger at the US is to flatter them, particularly the current administration. This war is between two of the aforementioned reactionary state apparatuses they also happened to leave behind…

    …In Bangkok there is a rogue military holding a civilian government hostage, in Phnom Penh there is a state gutted by the fever dreams of the Chicago School, both perpetrating a completely unjust and unnecessary conflict. The only losers in this war, however it ends, will be the poor of Thailand and Cambodia. This is what The Eastern Tigers and organisations like UNTAC were made for. Class war against the poor.

    Peace between nations is the only class-based solution.


  • What’s in a monument?

    I think what’s most interesting about the sculpture is that it stands out and looks very foreign - despite being the national monument. No other kind of sculpture exists in Malaysia, because it would be considered idolatrous to Islamic sensibilities for it’s human features. This has periodically caused mild uproar, but an important part of this story is that it was commissioned by Tunku Abdul Rahman, our first Prime Minister after seeing the Marine Corps War Memorial in Virginia in the midst of the Cold War. The following is taken from a blog post, highlighting the differences between the inscriptions of the monument and cenotaph between languages.

    Victory in two languages

    The dedication at the base of Tugu Negara is bilingual. The Malay version is written in the native Jawi script, which was the default in Malaysia before colonisation.

    Translations are rarely exact, since some meanings can’t make it across language worldviews. But in this case, the two versions are more or less faithful. The only shift in nuance is the focus on ‘heroic’ in English, whereas the Malay version merely mentions the warriors as fighting or struggling. I can’t really fault the translation though, since struggling in itself is worthy in our worldview, whether ‘heroic’ or not. And the Malay version demands more from the heroes. It requires that the struggle not merely be ‘in the cause of’, but to actually uphold peace and freedom.

    The sentiment on the cenotaph dedication has a similar difference. The Malay version is about the memory of the service of the fallen. The primary emotion is gratitude and grief, not glory.

    But I also noticed a different bilingual plaque. The versions were also generally faithful, but there was a single interesting deviation. In the English version, the figures of Tugu Negara represent the ‘triumph of the forces of democracy’ over the ‘forces of evil’. But the Malay version is nowhere so ideological. Instead, it merely says that the bronze figures represent the victory of our troops against our enemies.

    And I can’t fault this translation either. Literally translating the ‘triumph of forces of democracy over forces of evil’ would sound utterly ridiculous and cringe, to the pragmatic and semi-feudal Malay worldview. No. For us, the victory of value is the one that defends our sovereignty, whatever ideology we may choose to hold over time, against those who seek to undermine that sovereignty – whatever ideology they may choose to hold at the time.

    The differences in meaning showcases the dialectical process of decolonization and the material and historical bases of cultural difference. This nuance will not be captured by tourists or visitors passing by, but showcases the reality of the negotiations that occur between the colonial past and the post-colonial present in plain view - only if you are willing to understand.

    There has been sufficient discourse in highlighting how Tunku Abdul Rahman was westernised, and for someone like Sukarno, Malaysia itself was a comprador creation meant to solidify British control in Southeast Asia. That is why Konfrontasi (Indonesia-Malaysia war) happened soon after the federation’s declaration. I think the key part to this story is how no one could really imagine how reality would turn out. This reminds me of Chin Peng’s (the last secretary general of the MCP) salient critique and failures of the Party in his interview in 2003, from not adapting Maoist guerrila warfare strategy to the Malayan context, the inadequate and immature analysis of religion and particularly Islam, and the failure to recognize the fractures and differences between the reactionary and comprador classes (ie. the British big bourgeoisie, vs the Chinese capitalists or Malay aristocrats/petty bourgeois or in other words foreign vs local Capital, for example). The National Monument echoes perhaps all aspects of this critique through it’s inscriptions and history, despite the face-value anti-communist readings.


  • Historical divisions and the Japanese occupation in Malaya

    Japanese PM denounced in Malaysia for visiting cemetery to commemorate WWII Japanese soldiers and ignoring war atrocity

    Takaichi, after visiting, wrote in Japanese on social media platform X that she was able to “commemorate our ancestors who lost their lives in Malaysia,” and felt “deeply moved” by the experience.

    In the post and from her remarks, Takaichi neglected the acts of aggression and atrocities committed by the Japanese military during World War II in Malaysia, and it led to strong condemnation from Malaysia, despite that Japan’s Foreign Ministry claimed that Takaichi’s visit to the Japanese Cemetery in Kuala Lumpur was not a specific tribute to soldiers of the former Imperial Japanese Army.

    The main tweet of the Japanese PM being here, in which she also visited the Tugu Negara, the ‘national monument’ that was primarily dedicated to defeating the Axis powers during WW2, for which in Malaysia, would primarily have been Japan. As a result there was a bit of an (online) outcry of sorts for the apparent contradiction and insincerity about Japanese crimes across East and Southeast Asia.

    This is relatively old news by now, but I think gives an excuse to dig a little deeper and consider the implications of the Japanese occupation and the national monument for understanding modern-day Malaysian historical consciousness. As we all know, online media is not entirely representative of reactions and perceptions of reality, let alone can represent a material force on its own. This is especially true for Japanese occupation and historical grievances that were inconsistently felt across Malaya.

    read more

    Who do you fight when you are invaded on multiple fronts?

    Although Japanese invasion was definitely horrible, it did not impact every racial group equally. This would be critical in how anti-colonial movements, both national/petite bourgeois, proletariat and peasant groups in the country navigated tactical decisions when confronting both British colonialism and Japanese imperialism. It perhaps was one of the first major disagreements between those in the Malaysian Left.

    To quote an article I mentioned prior,

    Armed by these racial views, the Japanese augmented early Malay nationalist sentiments which had already existed at the time, for example, among the anti-colonial pan-Islamist Kaum Muda, with strong connections with the Middle East, and the left-wing group Kesatuan Melayu Muda, which was inspired by nationalist movements in Indonesia.88 To achieve its pro-Malay policy, the Japanese established leadership training schools known as the Koa Kunrenjo in the Straits Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca…

    Malay attitudes towards the British definitely took a downward turn, fuelled by their inflamed nationalist sentiments, no longer mystified by the invincibility of the British empire.95 However, they had to strategically navigate their relations with the British as ‘winner’ of the war, buttressed by the British ideological offensive against Japanese propaganda and compounded by Japanese reticence in remembering the war in Southeast Asia.96 All these worked in tandem to produce the Japanese Occupation as ‘an unfortunate anomaly of history’, an interregnum, rather than ‘a watershed in the history of the country’.97

    Brief description on the Japanese occupation

    This perceived closeness of the anti-colonial Malay Left to Japanese imperialists, soured relations with the Chinese communist movement in Malaya. Although history is never fully black and white, with collaborators of multiple kinds in any racial group, this underlying tension and race-class stratification lead to Malay parties holding a more ambivalent attitude to Japanese invasion, which was anaemic to the Chinese, who were facing their own ethnic cleansing through the Sook Ching massacres. Another infamous example was the “Death Railway” built in Thailand and Burma where hundreds of thousands died. Many Malays and Indians especially were captured and worked to lay across tracks across Mainland Southeast Asia. The MPAJA, or Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army, consisting mainly of ethnic Chinese, allied and obtain weapons from the British to repel Japanese occupation. It was only after WWII did they turn to guerrilla warfare against British colonisation. The prevalence of the Communist movement in fighting Japanese occupation meant that post-independence narratives by the ruling elite often had to sweep and downplay Japanese atrocities.

    Although the occupation was brief, it inflamed the class struggles that ultimately led to independence from British colonial rule, ending a century of enclosure and 500 years of direct European control.

    Nonetheless, Japanese imperial influence did not disappear. Malay nationalists adopted and adapted ideas from Japanese imperialism vis-à-vis British colonialism in forwarding localised visions of Malay nationalism and development.98 One of the most unambiguous manifestations of this can be found in the working papers prepared for the first BEC in 1965, an influential state-connected platform for mobilising Bumiputera causes and resources. In line with Abdul Razak’s aspiration,99 BEC 1965 was organised on the back of increasing Malay discontent with their economic conditions, particularly among the Malay petite bourgeoisie.100

    Who are our friends? Who are our enemies?

    Most of Malaya’s export oriented rubber and tin industry was brought through indetured labourers and former peasants from India and China. The royal institution and malay reservations were enacted to ‘secure’ the native peasantry’s existence against capitalist industry. For the Malay peasantry, Chinese capitalists were their biggest threat, for the Malay middle classes it was British colonialists. For the Chinese, whether anglo-aligned petty bourgeois or labour nationalist, fighting Japan was about defending China from imperialist threat abroad. After Japanese occupation, this contradiction between labourers and the peasantry was not adequately addressed - Chinese and Indian labourers had direct material interests in toppling British Capital but what about the peasants? To put it simply, progressive sections of the proletariat failed to organize the predominantly Malay peasantry, and their exploitation under non-British comprador classes. Their exploitation was not directly at the hands of the British bourgeoisie in the plantations and mines, and so being anti-British was not of an immediate material interest.

    It should also be noted that which language you were educated in would also ultimately determine your eventual class trajectories and positions. English-educated classes would obviously lean British, but the spread of literacy would eventually also spread anti-colonial, socialist and (British) labour unionist ideas among some of them. Chinese and Tamil educated groups would take inspiration from their own background anti-colonial fights back in India and China.

    Of course it is best to not over-emphasise this apparent incommensurability of material interests between different classes, and fall into liberal cynicism (and to some extent, historical nihilism). Certainly, the formation of AMCJA-PUTERA later on was a unity between various anti-colonial groups of different racial and class backgrounds. Although predominantly Chinese (about 90%), the MCP, or Communist Party of Malaya, had notable Malay-dominant army divisions (however this only really came about later during the Emergency), and one of the most notable Malay communists in the party being the chairman, Abdullah CD. The party also had networks with the “aboriginal” Orang Asli, especially after the British forced resettlements of 300,000 Chinese people, thereby cutting out the MCP’s main support base and supply lines, consisting about 5-10% of the Malayan population at that time.



  • speech continues

    These rules have led to the de-industrialisation of advanced countries in Europe and the US, and wage suppression in the developing countries in the Global South which had to, under this system, compete with their peers to attract foreign direct investment

    …We have been proposing to our progressive partners in SE Asia that Comrade Samir Amin’s proposal for partial de-linking from the global economy and the formation of regional blocks, should be the central strategy to

    a) retain a larger portion of the value created by the labour of the ordinary workers, farmers and business people in our region

    b) share a larger portion of the wealth created in ASEAN with the people who created it through higher prices for primary agricultural products, higher pay for our workers and more robust and comprehensive social protection schemes – such as high-quality health care, old age pension, reasonably priced rental residences, etc.

    SE Asia has a population of 680 million. That should provide sufficient economies of scale for the local manufacture of most of the goods we use in daily life, except for things like advanced medical technologies like robotic surgery and passenger airplanes. A policy of import substitution at an ASEAN level should be discussed by progressive movements in the region…

    …We need to uphold the principle that one of the primary roles of the economy is to generate enough jobs for all the people in that society who need work. The “right to life” is an empty slogan if it does not encompass the “right to livelihood” – to be offered work at a reasonable wage level. The principle of “Free trade” should not be used to undermine our people’s right to decent jobs.

    We need many new rules to move towards a better ASEAN. For example, ASEAN countries should commit to increasing corporate tax to 30% of profits over a period of 10 years. That would require Malaysia to increase its corporate tax rate by 0.6% annually as we are at 24% currently. Thailand, with a corporate tax of 19% at present, would have to go up 1.1% annually to make the target of 30% by 10 years. Increasing government revenue would help government provide better services to the people and to do serious climate mitigation work which is grossly overdue. Increase in government expenditure would augment aggregate demand, and this will provide a larger market for the businesses in the ASEAN region…

    Another programme that needs to be considered at ASEAN level is to overcome wage suppression and attain a living wage for all. At present the minimum wages in ASEAN are at different levels. Jakarta is at about 75% of Malaysia’s minimum wage. Sulawesi and Cambodia are at about 50% of Malaysia’s. ASEAN nations should commit to increase the minimum wage in all ASEAN countries by 10% each year for the next 10 years, starting from their differing starting points – so that at 10 years, we would be at double today’s wage rate though still at different absolute levels. The benefits are obvious – lower income families would live better, eat more nutritious food and have better financial security. Businesses of all sizes would have a larger market to sell to.6 The increase in manufacturing and commercial activities would generate jobs that are desperately required all over ASEAN. Quite probably, government tax collection would also go up.

    …Would this lead to a flight of investment capital?

    Unlikely that capital will flee to advanced countries or to NE Asia. As explained earlier, the wage level in ASEAN is about 1/6thto 1/12 of that in Europe, the US and North East Asia. Translocation of investment capital to neighbouring ASEAN countries has been the possibility that national policy makers have had to be wary about. But if ASEAN countries had a unified policy on wage increase, where would international capital run to? The wages in the advanced countries would still be more than 3 times higher even after we managed to double ASEAN wage rates.

    Africa might be a choice for international capital still dependent on very low wages. If that develops, we (being progressive internationalists) should not begrudge poorer African nations this opportunity to attract investments, create jobs and build their economies. Africa is still the poorest and most marginalized continent. But being one of the last remaining bastions of overly suppressed wages, they would be in a better bargaining power to insist on more decent returns for their countries in terms of wages and technology transfer.


  • Globalization, Trump’s tariff war and APEC 2025

    This speech itself is worth reading in its entirety. Here’s some of it below.

    However, it is likely that the ordinary people of SE Asia and elsewhere, are going to be affected by these tariffs. There is a high likelihood that these tariffs will spark a global economic recession. US goods imports amounted to USD 3.3 trillion or about 11% of the US GDP in 2024. With Trumps tariffs levied on friend and foe alike, prices of goods in the US are going to go up an average of 10 to 15%.2 Unless there is a concomitant increase in the income of US citizens, the effective aggregate demand in the US is going to shrink significantly. This means that the demand for goods and services from both US firms and the firms exporting to the US is going to decrease by at least 10 – 15%. Given the size of the US economy, this decrease in aggregate demand is likely to set off a deep recession – perhaps in about 18 months for now.

    The Malaysian government does not seem to take this possibility too seriously at present. They are forecasting a growth rate of 4.0 to 4.5% for the Malaysian economy for 2026. Progressive movements in all continents should be prepared to mount campaigns to ensure that our governments handle this recession on the basis of solidarity if it actually develops. No one must be deprived of basic needs whether it be food, shelter, medical care or education. Society must marshal its resources to ensure that no member of society is left behind.

    read more

    …That rules based order benefited the global elite and richest corporations far more than it benefited ordinary people. Consider the case of Malaysia. There are many who would call Malaysia a success story as it’s per capita GDP and health indices are better than many other countries in Asia and Africa.

    Malaysia’s GDP grew 24-fold (in real terms) in the 50 years between 1970 and 2020. So, there would seem to be empirical basis for the postulate that Malaysia benefited from the rules based international order. But, if we investigate a little more deeply, we will find that :

    – 60% to 70% of the Malaysian working population have to work more than 10 hours per day to make ends meet for their families.

    – the prevalence of stunting for under-5 children is about 21% of the under-5 population in Malaysia. Stunting refers to heights less than the 3rd percentile of the normal range for that age bracket. It indicates long term malnutrition.

    – About 40% of Malaysian graduates cannot get jobs that are commensurate with their training. They are forced to accept semi-skilled jobs at low wages or enter the gig market as motorcycle delivery riders.

    – Old age poverty is a sad reality in Malaysia. About 70% of all those above the age of 65 years do not have any savings of their own and have to rely on their children or other relatives for their basic needs. (Malaysia has not yet committed to a universal old age pension scheme.)

    – The younger generation is experiencing a mental health epidemic with many of them on medicines for anxiety and depression.

    – Our public health care system has been chronically under-funded for the past 40 years. This has resulted in congested clinics and wards as well as inordinately long waiting times, delayed treatment and poorer health outcomes.

    The problem with Globalisation based on the “Rules based order” that has been promoted all over the world since the 1980’s, is that most of the rules favour the largest corporations and the richest individuals in society. The pro-elite rules include the following

    Intellectual Property Rights provisions that have been used by the largest corporations to create monopolies and extract high rates of profit by bullying the subordinate firms in the value chains.

    “National Treatment” provisions. Many “Free Trade Agreements” require governments to give at least similar access to foreign investors as they give to local companies.

    – The Investor State Dispute Settlement provision allows the biggest MNCs to haul governments to international tribunals if any aspect of government’s policies restricts the profits of the MNCs. It is considered “expropriation”.

    Unrestricted flow of capital across national boundaries. This has created a situation that has forced government to reduce tax rates for corporations and the richest individuals. This occurred both in the advanced economies as well as in the global South. In the ASEAN region for example, there has been a race-to-the-bottom in corporate taxes. Malaysia has reduced its corporate tax from 40% of profits in 1988, to its current 24% of profits. Malaysia felt pressured to do so because its neighbours also acted similarly, with Thailand’s and Vietnam’s corporate tax currently at 20%, and Singapore’s at 17%. The SE Asean countries have been reducing corporate tax in a bid to attract FDI as well as to ensure that domestic investors do not relocate to neighbouring countries.

    The “Zero Tariff Regime” of Free Trade Agreements have markedly eroded the economic sovereignty of governments. For example, the ASEAN FTA has brought the tariffs of 99% of goods traded among ASEAN countries to zero, and this FTA has the provision that tariffs can only be lowered, but never raised. As a consequence, the Malaysian government is apprehensive that raising the minimum wage for Malaysian workers might affect the competitiveness of Malaysian firms and lead to the loss of both the domestic and the exports markets to firms from other ASEAN countries.


  • This speech showcases the gradual culmination of national consciousness inculcated by the bourgeoisie, following the Malaysian Islamic scholar Al-Attas’s call for the “Islamization of Knowledge”. Anwar represents the cosmopolitan, progressive Muslim intellectual trying to carve their own place in a post 9/11 world capitalist system. Certainly, it echoes historical third-worldism and non-alignment, and represents the ongoing contradictions of a deeply unequal, racialised capitalist economic system.

    Anwar: Malaysians must break free from backward and colonial mindsets

    PUTRAJAYA: Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim has called for Malaysians to be freed from backward and colonial mindsets, highlighting the prevalence of hate speech that demeans others based on skin colour and religion.

    He stressed the urgent need to reform the education system to cultivate a generation of progressive, courageous thinkers grounded in their own values.

    He said that despite nearly seven decades of independence, some Malaysians still regarded foreign ideas as absolute solutions rather than developing a confident, home-grown intellectual framework.

    etc

    "We are a post-independence nation, but our ideas are not yet fully free — our thinking is still shaped by external moulds. This is what I call ‘post-colonial angst’ — still grappling with ideas dominated by others.

    He stressed that education should not be seen merely as the pursuit of knowledge, but as a process of shaping the intellect and soul to discern truth, justice, and humanity.

    Anwar also cautioned against narrow-minded thinking that stifled progress and reform.

    Anwar said that intellectual and ideological renewal had always been central to great Islamic thinkers and remains relevant in today’s modern world.

    “AI (artificial intelligence) is a necessity — but AI must be anchored in values. We cannot technologise humanity; we must humanise technology.”

    Anwar also said that starting next year, the government would introduce free education for the poorest groups, from preschool to university, as an initial step.