• 1 Post
  • 7 Comments
Joined 7 days ago
cake
Cake day: June 14th, 2026

help-circle


  • You really need to start waking up, man. The hosting service that would actually be suitable for this type of content is one with end-to-end encryption, which I chose not to implement.

    As for the part where I explain to them “how to do it,” it seems pretty logical to me that anyone including me who runs a file-hosting service and responds to reports can see your files. So this “tip” that I “suggested” (in quotes) to encrypt your files is just common sense.

    People didn’t wait for me to upload CSAM, and malicious actors didn’t wait for me to figure out how to encrypt their files. I won’t even address the comment about the logo, which is childish and irrelevant to the discussion




  • You’re right, and I won’t pretend otherwise. Someone determined to host illegal content can encrypt it client-side and I’d never see it.

    But that isn’t where most of the abuse on an open drop host comes from. The whole point of dumping that content somewhere is that the link is easy to click and the file just opens.

    Client-side encryption breaks that the recipient needs the key, nothing previews or streams so the lazy and opportunistic uploads which are the bulk of it stay in plaintext.

    Being able to remove what I can actually see is real harm reduction even if it never catches the careful ones. Locks don’t stop a determined burglar either, we still fit them.

    The deciding factor for me is reports. With plaintext, when someone flags a file I can look and pull it. With E2EE I’m structurally incapable of acting on any report even when I want to.

    I’m not willing to run a server where, if you show me there’s CSAM sitting on my disk, I cannot take it down. That’s the line and it’s not a technical one

    As for the trust E2EE would buy, anyone who genuinely needs confidentiality already has it they can encrypt before uploading to any host, mine included.

    So adding E2EE here would cost me all of that moderation ability in exchange for convenience my privacy-minded users can already get themselves. For a casual share-with-expiry tool, that trade isn’t worth it to me. You’re not wrong that it’s the dilemma of file hosting.

    I just landed on the side of being able to answer a report, and I’d rather be honest that the password is casual privacy than sell E2EE I’d then be helpless behind.



  • Hello, there is currently no end-to-end encryption on the server I’ll explain why below. The reasons why

    True end-to-end encryption (where I literally can’t read your files) means the server only ever sees encrypted blobs. The problem is, that also means I can’t scan anything, and right now every upload is checked against known CSAM and run through malware scanning.

    Go fully zero-knowledge and I lose that capability entirely, which on an anonymous host is a real problem it basically turns into a blind dropbox for whatever people want to put there.

    So it’s genuinely one or the other either I can see enough of the content to keep it clean, or I can’t see it at all and can’t keep it clean. I chose to keep it scannable, because for an open anonymous service, I think being able to block that kind of content is more important.

    That’s the real reason there’s no at-rest encryption not laziness it would compromise security. I’m open to hearing how you’d weigh the pros and cons, though.